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USSR Report

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No. 4, April 1984

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31 July 1984

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 4, April 1984

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U.S.-WEST EUROPE DIFFERENCES ON STRATEGIC, TRADE POLICIES VIEWED

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[Article by G. A. Vorontsov: "The United States and Western Europe: Community and Contradictions at a New Stage"]

[Text] Since Washington and its allies began deploying American intermediate-range missiles in a number of West European countries at the end of 1983 a fundamentally new and far more dangerous situation has been created. Yet another spiral of the nuclear arms race has begun. The question is also one of fundamentally limiting the West European states' sovereignty, these states having become Washington's nuclear hostages, and of serious damage having been done to European and world security.

Turning Western Europe into a launching pad for nuclear missiles aimed at the USSR and its allies has increased the real danger of the United States bringing catastrophe to the European peoples. "By deploying missiles in Europe," noted K. U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his speech to voters on 2 March 1983, "the Americans have put obstacles in the way of negotiations not only on 'European' nuclear missiles but also on strategic ones."

Proceeding from the fact that the continuation of negotiations after the deployment of missiles has already begun can only be a screen for the actions of the United States and other NATO countries, actions aimed at undermining European and international security, the USSR has announced that it considers its further participation in negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe to be impossible.

The USSR's unilateral commitment to observe a moratorium on the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the European part of the USSR has been abrogated. With the agreement of the GDR and CSSR governments, preparatory work for the deployment of operational-tactical missiles with increased range on these countries' territory has been speeded up, and the first Soviet missiles have already been deployed there.

Since the United States has increased the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union by deploying its missiles in Europe, it is planned to deploy the appropriate

Soviet missiles in the ocean regions and seas. The characteristic features of these missiles make them an adequate response to the threat created for the USSR and its allies by the American missiles being deployed in Europe.

The countermeasures adopted by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are forced. The USSR has once again confirmed that it does not aspire to military superiority and is only doing what is completely necessary to prevent the military balance from being upset. "The countermeasures on the Soviet side will be kept strictly within the bounds dictated by the actions of the NATO countries.... If the United States and other NATO countries show a readiness to return to the situation that existed before the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles began in Europe, the Soviet Union will also be prepared to do this. Then the proposals we introduced earlier on the problems of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons in Europe would once again be in force," Yu. V. Andropov said in his statement of 24 November 1983.¹

The deployment of new American nuclear weapons in Western Europe will considerably increase the risk of retribution. This risk will be increased many times over, especially for the FRG, since the most clearly identifiable first-strike weapon--the Pershing-II missile--is being deployed on its soil.

The course of the winter session of the NATO Council in Brussels in December 1983 confirmed that the appearance of new American missiles represents the start of a concentrated spiral of the arms race into which the countries of Western Europe are also being drawn by the United States. This spiral is exceptionally dangerous from the political standpoint and onerous from the economic standpoint: Once again these countries are forcibly being equipped with American weapons of a new generation, this time with greater fire power, and are being forced to increase appropriations for military purposes, including their "share" of the American program for the militarization of space.

In addition to new American missiles, "militarism, hostility and military psychosis are being exported to Western Europe," said A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and minister of foreign affairs, while speaking on 18 January 1984 at the conference on confidence-building measures and security and disarmament in Europe. "Those who try to lull the peoples of the West European countries with false promises of peace in the shadow of American missiles take the heavy responsibility for this deception upon themselves."

Implementing the U.S. and NATO plans could be quite dangerous not only for Europe but also for mankind as a whole, because it will increase the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

In contrast to this, the USSR is prepared to do everything to halt the dangerous slide into the abyss. Peace can be strengthened and the security of peoples can be guaranteed not by increasing and inventing more and more new types of weapons, but rather by reducing the existing number of weapons to an immeasurably lower level.

By beginning its deployment of missiles, the United States has rendered the Geneva talks basically meaningless, since they were aimed at preventing the

deployment of new missiles and at reducing the number of existing weapons.

Evaluating this extremely dangerous turn of events, the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community proceed from the fact that Washington forms its policy within the framework of the "crusade" it has declared against socialism as a social system. By deploying Pershing-II and cruise missiles in a number of NATO countries, the United States and its allies want to base this adventurist policy concretely on nuclear missiles. They hope thus to upset the approximate balance of military--including nuclear--forces existing in Europe and in the world and thereby to undermine the basis of European security and stability.

The development of international relations already demonstrates the exceptionally negative consequences of this policy. In this connection, two trends have begun to be observed more clearly. The first is that, owing to the United States' aggressive actions, tension continues to mount and the level of military opposition between the USSR and United States, and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, is rising, thus drawing closer to that dangerous line that divides peace from war. Second, the process of negotiations based on the peaceful resolution of disputes and on respect and consideration for one another's interests, that is, the channel of international relations that was the basis of the foreign policy of states when the process of detente was being actively developed, is being fundamentally undermined. Not only the United States but also its NATO allies--the FRG, Britain and Italy, which have consented to the deployment of new American missiles--have thereby taken a serious step along the path of intensifying military confrontation with the USSR and other countries of the socialist community.

Regarding the organization of an anti-Soviet and anticommunist "crusade" as being of paramount importance in its foreign policy, the Reagan Administration has directed its main arrows against the USSR and other socialist countries. But it would be politically short-sighted to think that the United States' aggressive policy poses a serious threat only to the USSR and the countries of the socialist community. This kind of policy is extremely dangerous for all peoples and states, including the United States' West European allies. In particular, this policy also plays a considerable role in Washington's aspirations to restore U.S. political and economic hegemony in Western Europe and to correct the correlation of forces in the imperialist camp, which is rent with contradictions and rivalry, in its own favor.

The emphasis on deploying the Pershing-II and cruise missiles under any circumstances and the potential thus created of carrying out a first strike in direct proximity to vitally important centers of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries testify to a fundamental evolution in U.S. strategic thinking. The concept of "limited nuclear war" in the European theater is being brought more and more definitely into the foreground.

Washington strategists are under the illusion that if missiles are launched at targets in the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries from Western Europe instead of from U.S. territory retribution will fall on Europe and not on the United

States. The countries of Western Europe are thereby allotted the unenviable fate of being U.S. nuclear hostages which Washington is prepared to expose to a counterstrike.

It is clear to any objective expert, however, that limiting a nuclear war is impossible. Beginning in one place, a nuclear conflagration would inevitably spread and inflict unacceptable injury not only on individual states and peoples but also on all mankind. The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned of the danger of nuclear weapons use, having pledged not to be the first to use these weapons.

Many political and social figures and the broad popular masses in the West also oppose the use of nuclear weapons. West Europeans show the most concern over the possibility of a nuclear war in Europe, as they become more and more aware of the vulnerability of their own position as the result of any kind of "nuclear exchange." American calculations on a "limited" conflict and "limited" losses are hardly capable of deluding anyone, since we are talking about a continent with an exceptionally high concentration of people.

These problems are analyzed in great detail by one of the leading associates of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, G. Treverton, in his book "Nuclear Weapons in Europe." "The step across the nuclear threshold will have incalculable consequences" for political leaders, he writes. In Treverton's opinion, the most important aspect of this problem is connected with the fact that "nuclear exchanges will rapidly get out of control." He regards hopes for any real limitation, "selective" strikes and other such nuclear strikes as illusory, since "no rational leader would seriously believe in any of these things if nuclear weapons actually began to be used."²

The aforementioned concepts have also been refuted by American experts who have pointed out that a war in Europe would also be disastrous for the United States itself. Authors such as L. Baylenson and S. Cohen emphasize that any war starting in Europe would extend to the United States. "We can survive without the Western alliance (NATO--G. V.)...but a nuclear war can destroy us," the authors conclude.³

At the same time, the intensified trend of soberly appraising the possibilities and consequences of "nuclear exchanges" on the European continent have not changed the essence of the official positions clearly reflected in documents of sessions of the NATO Council. Thus, the concluding communique of the NATO Council session in Brussels in May 1982 states: "The presence of the U.S. Armed Forces on the European continent and the U.S. strategic nuclear commitments in Europe are inseparable from the security of the allies." And further on: "The deployment of the intermediate-range missiles will start as scheduled toward the end of 1983."⁴

This position continues to be shared and supported by rightwing forces in political circles of the United States and Europe, loyal "Atlanticists" of both sides of the ocean. One of the latest reports of the U.S. Atlantic Council discusses the need to further strengthen NATO, for which purpose--according

to the report's authors--it will be necessary to continue to deploy U.S. land, air and naval forces in Europe and to increase and modernize the NATO Armed Forces.⁵

U.S. and NATO official documents formerly asserted that the "missile solution" would be carried out only in the absence of any progress at the Geneva talks. However, these assertions were clearly pro forma because it was precisely Washington's obstructionist position that led to the impasse in the talks. The United States openly blocked the way to a diplomatic solution of the problem in order to start deploying missiles.

Responsibility for the failure of the Geneva talks falls fully on the United States. At the same time this responsibility is also shared by West European politicians who disregard their own peoples' interests by helping Washington to carry out its militarist plans. These states therefore must assume, together with the U.S. administration, full responsibility for the consequences of a shortsighted policy about which the USSR had warned them earlier.

These governments have disregarded the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the population of their own countries, which have found their clear expression in mass antimissile demonstrations and movements and in the adoption of appeals and resolutions and which have been reflected in public opinion polls. The historical experience of two world wars which inflicted colossal sacrifices and devastation on Europe but did not touch U.S. territory gives Europeans a different view of the prospect of a conflict on the continent. The rise of the antiwar movement in the West and, above all, in Western Europe, a movement unprecedented in modern times, testifies that Washington's confrontation policy is encountering growing opposition. The antiwar movements are primarily aimed against Washington's "missile plan."

Authoritative Western experts have repeatedly pointed out the nonexistence of any military need for new American missiles on the European continent. Thus, according to R. McNamara, former U.S. secretary of defense, NATO has no military need to deploy the Pershing-II and cruise missiles in order to maintain a "reliable deterrent" because there are already 300,000 American soldiers in Western Europe and the "deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles will add nothing to this guarantee."⁶

The following circumstance is no less important. Those who allow the deployment of American missiles on their territory essentially place the security of West European states in the hands of the U.S. administration. As we know, the latter is not only unpredictable in its behavior on the international scene but is also inclined to take chances. The U.S. intervention in Lebanon, the occupation of Grenada, the aggressive policy in Central America and the increasingly close ties with the most reactionary regimes and groups in the world--all of this embodies the strategy of "state terrorism" that Washington has adopted in its armaments.

Attempts have been made to convince the West Europeans that Washington would "consult" their leaders before pressing the button to launch the missiles. But who can believe these assertions in light of Washington's aforementioned

actions and the fact that the finger pushing the button is the finger of these statesmen on the other side of the ocean who are known to "shoot before they think"?

Recently Western publications have often drawn parallels between the international situations of the present and the 1930's. People in the West are becoming aware that it is the U.S. strategy of economic and military domination that is threatening international peace and stability. For example, English political scientists D. and C. Roberts note: "In the 1930's the threat was Hitler, who was able to carry out the first part of his plan for world domination. Now it is the United States, with its more than 2,500 military bases in 110 countries and half a million troops outside its boundaries--troops equipped with tens of thousands of nuclear munitions.⁷

It is clear that this is depriving the West Europeans of the opportunity, created by international detente, to pursue their own international political goals--ones which differ from American international political goals--independently and with a view to their own national interests.

Washington has also changed its approach to the safeguarding of U.S. national security, which has always been proclaimed as the chief priority of foreign policy. Whereas in the 1970's, according to official interpretations, this approach amounted to the formula of "strength and negotiations," negotiations are now placed in parentheses and military strength has moved to the forefront. This approach is contrary to the United States' own interests because it undermines, and does not strengthen, its security, and it is also contrary to the interests of the West European countries because, as stated above, it will weaken their independent positions and will force their ruling circles to make policy with a view to Washington's wishes for the sake of maintaining allied relations with the United States, and not for the sake of safeguarding the vital interests of their own states.

Nevertheless, the policy of the American administration certainly does not enjoy the unconditional support of the West European governments. In an analysis of differences in the approaches of members of the "Atlantic community" to matters of war and peace, S. Sloane, an expert on U.S. relations with the allies from the research office of the Library of Congress, notes: "Europe has obtained many more tangible advantages from detente than the United States. To a great extent, this causes the (West) Europeans to...want to protect the fruits of detente."⁸

Parliamentary debates in Britain, the FRG and Italy have shown that the governments of these countries had to make considerable efforts to obtain the necessary majority of votes in support of the decision to deploy the new American missiles. Of course, members of West European governments and the majority of their parliamentarians are guided in their actions by class interests. Representing one segment of the world bourgeoisie, they are interested in strengthening capitalism's position in the world. They regard NATO as a "necessary counterbalance" to the USSR and the Warsaw Pact and view its "survival" and reinforcement as a matter of primary importance. However, the current situation has some distinctive features. This is due to the fact that

an intense struggle is now taking place between the two world social systems under conditions of parity in the correlation of forces and under conditions of strategic parity between the USSR and the United States.

People in the West European capitals are well aware that any attempt at resolving the historical controversy between the two systems by means of a military conflict--to which the most reckless imperialist circles, primarily in the United States, are inclined--would be disastrous for all mankind. For this reason the inclination to find peaceful solutions to problems, to limit weapons, to observe existing agreements and to work out new ones is stronger on the whole in these capitals than in Washington, regardless of the wide range of views.

Taking the current situation into account, the United States is resorting to "arm-twisting" tactics to cut off channels of dialogue between the West and East and block the process of all-European cooperation. In this way it hopes to limit the independence of its allies not only in their actions but also in adopting positions in the sphere of mutual relations between states of opposing systems. Washington would like to deprive its partners of all alternatives except that of a clearer recognition of the dominant U.S. role in the North Atlantic alliance--that is, a clearer orientation to one or another form of submission to it.

The law of the uneven development of capitalism, formulated by V. I. Lenin, has manifested itself quite clearly in recent decades in the redistribution of power among imperialist states. Several West European states and Japan have intensified their pressure on the United States, especially in the economic sphere. From 1950 to 1980 the U.S. share of the industrial product of the capitalist countries declined from 50 to 34 percent and the U.S. share of world capitalist exports declined from 18 to 12 percent. The U.S. share of gold currency reserves displayed the most dramatic decline: from 50 percent in 1952 to 5.9 percent in 1980 (the gold currency reserves of the FRG alone were about twice the size of American reserves).

The growth of West European capitalism's power and influence has been accomplished by the development of integration within the framework of the EEC, which has become the core of the imperialist "power center" in the Old World. The realities of U.S. relations with Western Europe, especially in the 1970's, have been so out of keeping with the doctrines of "harmonious development" that they have aroused serious concern on the other side of the ocean.

The intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry has weakened the once dominant U.S. position, even in the sphere of political leadership in the capitalist world. Ruling circles experienced particular concern over the development of detente in Europe when their West European partners tried to develop relations with their Eastern neighbors by fundamentally expanding their field of economic and political maneuver and going beyond the bounds of rigid "Atlantic discipline."

The American establishment has certainly not adopted a single-minded attitude toward the successes of the West European center. Guided by interests of

class solidarity, ruling U.S. circles have obviously promoted the stabilization and reinforcement of West European capitalism in every way possible. At the same time there has been growing concern in political, military and business spheres over the fact that Washington's allies are acting more and more frequently as economic competitors and political rivals.

In his memoirs, former Secretary of State H. Kissinger evaluates the "expansion and strengthening of European unity" as "the end of automatic American superiority in the West, characteristic of the period after 1945." "After (Western) Europe became economically stronger and more unified from the political standpoint," he writes, "the Atlantic community could not remain an American patrimony where consultations served primarily to precisely define American projects."⁹

The weakening of American leadership of the Western world and the erosion of the dominant positions of U.S. monopoly capital have been connected more and more frequently to some degree or another with the evolution of the West European "power center." Thus, in a report on the strengthening of NATO, prepared by a special task force of the U.S. Atlantic Council, chaired by the well-known figures K. Rush and B. Scowcroft, the authors consider the main reason for the weakening of U.S. positions in the world to be the growing strength of the USSR and Western Europe.¹⁰ While elaborating ways of strengthening the Western alliance, the report's authors set as a priority aim the need to strengthen intra-bloc unity, foreseeing that the most acute problems within NATO in the near future would be caused not by war or regional military confrontation but by the threat of bloc unity being undermined through unfavorable events in NATO countries or through crisis situations in Europe and beyond its boundaries.¹¹

Internal Atlantic problems are also brought into the forefront in another, no less voluminous research work conducted by the Carnegie Fund and entitled "Challenges for U.S. National Security." In the authors' opinion, "the most serious political difficulty for NATO" is the need for its sovereign members to "act together, quickly and decisively."¹²

The American side thinks that many of NATO's problems can be solved only by strengthening the United States' leading role within the bloc and only under the conditions of exacerbated confrontation with the USSR and socialist states and of intense struggle against the forces of the national liberation movement. Thus, methods and means of force are brought into the foreground in order to oppose changes in the correlation of forces in the world and the redistribution of influence within the imperialist system.

Interpreting these changes in terms of the "loss of American leadership" or the threat of this loss, ever since the end of the 1970's, and with renewed vigor under the Reagan Administration, ruling U.S. circles have combined their efforts to undermine international detente with an offensive against the political and economic positions of their partner-competitors. The White House deliberately emphasizes the resolution of disputes by military means and by means of force, especially since in this sphere U.S. leadership within the imperialist camp has essentially not been shaken as yet. In this respect,

Washington consciously jeopardizes the interests of its allies, primarily of those interested in the development of the detente process. Thus, in evaluating the "shift toward a tough line" in U.S. foreign policy that has taken place since the Reagan Administration took power, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT described this shift as a transition to "nationalism in relations with other states. In concrete terms, this means that the United States is less inclined to compromise on the way to agreement--whether in negotiations on trade with its allies or in arms control talks with Russia."¹³

The incumbent Washington leadership obviously considers the situation in the 1980's to be suitable for the fulfillment of U.S. foreign policy tasks connected with strengthening the North Atlantic bloc. The active exploitation of NATO's military-political levers to help compensate for weak points in economics and trade is thought to be the most effective means in this respect. It is precisely this path that the Reagan Administration has chosen as the main one for developing relations with its "closest allies and friends," as the West European states are officially termed.

The United States hopes to overcome its serious differences with Western Europe and to reduce the approaches of various countries to a common "Atlantic" denominator. This will not be one of the easiest tasks to perform.

The prominent American political scientist and Harvard University professor, S. Hoffman, notes three basic spheres of contradiction in foreign policy between the United States and its NATO partners during the time the Reagan Administration has been in power. First, Washington considers heightened confrontation with the USSR to be of paramount importance while its allies wish to keep the achievements and advantages of lessened tension; second, the United States is striving for the geographic expansion of NATO's functions, but the West European states as a whole oppose this because they do not wish to be drawn into a world conflict as a result of events happening somewhere in El Salvador; finally, the Americans and West Europeans have differing views of the Soviet Union's foreign policy as a whole and of its individual regional aspects.¹⁴

In another of his works, "NATO and Nuclear Weapons," Hoffman emphasizes that for many West Europeans President Reagan's decision on the neutron bomb or his opinions on the "possibility of a limited nuclear exchange in Europe" represent a part of his general policy line. They are disturbed by the fact that the American administration "does not believe in the possibility of dialogue with Moscow" and also "by what they regard as American nostalgia for the 1950's, for the era of American nuclear superiority...and unconditional American leadership in an alliance of unequal partners (NATO--G. V.)."¹⁵

The deployment of new American missiles is called upon to sharply raise the level of confrontation in Europe and the world and to exacerbate relations between East and West still further. A situation favorable to U.S. militarist circles has thus been created, in which Western Europe is prevented from strengthening its own positions and freeing itself of American influence. In an interview in Rome's RINASCITA on 6 May 1983, prominent American sociologist I. Wallerstein noted: "I consider the issue of Euromissiles to be a kind of political maneuver (by the United States) aimed at influencing the whole complex

of relations in the Western bloc and thus at achieving the desired results in the economic sphere as well."

By drawing its allies into a "crusade," the United States, with obvious advantage to itself, utilizes their economic resources and political potential and forces them to pay politically and materially for pursuing its aggressive policy.

The results of the meeting of the leaders of the leading seven capitalist states in Williamsburg in summer 1983 clearly testify to this. Through active pressure and "arm-twisting," the United States succeeded in forcing its partners to adopt (for the first time in the history of these meetings) a special "political declaration on security issues," which expresses support for its aggressive policy, primarily with regard to the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. Washington's demands for the approval of this document were not accompanied by any serious concessions in the economic sphere as the West Europeans had hoped. Washington refused to adopt realistic measures requested by its allies, particularly in the regulation of currency relations and the reduction of budget deficits and interest rates, and confined itself to agreeing to refer to these matters in the abstract in an economic declaration. In other words, the West European states made serious concessions to the United States in the military and political sphere, while Washington used this to its advantage without doing anything significant in exchange.¹⁶

In fact, the colossal U.S. budget deficit continues to be a serious threat to the normal functioning of the West's monetary system. The chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, M. Feldstein, frankly said that projected U.S. budget deficits will create conditions for high bank credit discount rates, which attract foreign investors.¹⁷ This means that a powerful channel is created through which European capital can flow to the other side of the ocean, capital which could, under different circumstances, be used effectively within the countries concerned. There is no need to prove how important this can be in a crisis.

It is paradoxical but true that, by pumping capital across the ocean, the NATO allies are financing much of Washington's arms race, buying American securities with which the U.S. Government covers its budget deficit. The chief economist of the First Boston Corporation, A. Woynilauer, is of the opinion that the United States covers its expenditures on the buildup of military strength with foreign financial sources.¹⁸

The clearly excessive exchange rate of the American dollar (by 20-25 percent) in comparison to West European currencies is still inflicting direct losses on the economies of the West European states. Aside from everything else, this means higher prices for many imports, primarily oil and other raw materials whose purchase prices are calculated in dollars. France, for example, had to increase its expenditure on oil products alone by a billion dollars last year for this very reason.

Washington's selfish economic and monetary policies, which it certainly does not intend to renounce, are consciously aimed at weakening its competitors.

This situation is causing the West Europeans serious concern, but their requests and appeals to the White House remain unanswered. What is more, it appears that the more concessions the West European leaders make to the Reagan Administration, the more firmly this administration believes that further pressure must be applied.

In its years in power, the Washington administration has done everything to block economic, trade, scientific, technical and other relations between West European countries and socialist states. It has thereby tried to destroy the material basis of detente, on the one hand, and to prevent the diversification of the West European states' economic relations and their liberation from the influence of American monopolies on the other.

The development of trade and other forms of exchange between East and West during the past decade has aroused serious concern among the American monopolies, which have no wish to let Western Europe out of the orbit of their influence. This is particularly obvious in key spheres such as energy supply, for example. Let us recall what dramatic heights of fury were reached in the inter-Atlantic dispute over the "gas pipeline" project. In the opinion of the editor of the West German weekly DIE ZEIT, the acute exacerbation of relations at that time was indicative of the crisis in inter-Atlantic relations. "This conflict escalated the disagreements between (Western) Europe and the United States, rising to the level of indignation, mutual recriminations and retribution...."¹⁹

The Reagan Administration made every effort, to the point of sanctions against its allies, to stop the project. Behind the political-strategic arguments of Washington loomed the shadow of the U.S. oil monopolies that did not wish to lose their influence (suffice it to say that 13 branches of the American Exxon, Texaco and Mobil Oil companies control approximately one-half of the West European market for oil and petroleum products).

The positions of U.S. transnational corporations in the production of computer technology and computers are even more impressive. The American IBM concern, aided by three major branches and scores of plants, produces 80 percent of Western Europe's computers. All in all, more than 10,000 large and medium-sized firms are controlled by American capital in this sphere. Branches of the American automobile giants, especially General Motors and Ford, manufacture approximately every fourth car in Western Europe. Thus, U.S. monopolies control 20 percent of Britain's industry, 16 percent of France's and around 30 percent of Belgium's and the Netherlands'.

It is indicative that the growth rates of U.S. capital investments in Western Europe are considerably higher than those of total American foreign investments. In 1981, 60 percent of all direct U.S. capital investments in the developed capitalist countries were made in that region, and in the decade after 1971 direct American capital investments in Western Europe increased more than 3.5-fold, from 28.654 billion dollars to 101.318 billion.²⁰

Addressing the Congress, former Deputy Secretary of State K. Rush spoke quite frankly about the importance of Western Europe for the United States: "In no

way should it be thought that our vital interest in Europe is only a matter of history or custom. Our very welfare depends on it. Europe is actually turning into an increasingly powerful center of the world economy, it represents our most important market and it is also our most important supplier. Our prosperity and the prosperity of the entire world have become strongly dependent on Western Europe. This insures work and dividends for Americans as well as their high standard of living."²¹

Proceeding from its own egotistical interests, the United States wants to have the Atlantic allies within the orbit of its economic, political and military influence and continue to have Europe divided into opposing groups. For this reason it is sparing no efforts to force the West European NATO partners to orient themselves to "Atlanticism," interpreting this as an exclusive alignment with the United States.

Judging by all available evidence, "Atlanticism" in its current American interpretation is an alternative to the positive development of Europe-wide processes and Europe represents the forward theater of military actions, a theater situated in immediate proximity to the Warsaw Pact states.

In summation, we emphasize once again that the U.S. aggressive military strategy and the deliberate escalation of world tension are primarily aimed against the USSR and its allies, the national liberation forces, and peace and progress. At the same time, as is obvious to the naked eye, as they say, it is no less important to the United States that by relying on this policy it can strengthen its positions in the inter-imperialist competitive struggle, "discipline" the allies and, under the guise of a "crusade," solve its own economic problems at their expense.

It is hardly possible that this development of events could suit the West Europeans who want to be in command of their own fate, their possibilities and their resources. In the final analysis, the actual interests of the European states, regardless of their different socioeconomic systems, consist in the defense of peace, the prevention of nuclear catastrophe and the development of mutually beneficial cooperation. Experience has shown that the level of security and cooperation on the European continent rises as the ability of the European states to work together on the vitally important tasks facing them grows and as military and political opposition declines.

"It is no secret that some forces want to bury detente," A. A. Gromyko said in his speech at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe. "But people value the fruits produced by detente in the 1970's. Detente must not die, because it expresses the aspiration of people to peace and life."²²

The Soviet Union's position on this matter is clear. K. U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has reaffirmed it: "We are against competition in the buildup of nuclear arsenals. We have always advocated the prohibition and destruction of all weapons of this type.... As for Europe, we still favor the removal of all nuclear weapons from this territory, both medium-range and tactical. We believe that both sides should take the first

big step in this direction without delay. Furthermore, the Soviet Union does not want to strengthen its own security at the expense of others but wants equal security for all."²³

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THE MEDIA AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 22 Mar 84) pp 14-24

[Article by A. B. Pankin]

[Text] Relations with the mass media are a matter of importance to all of the forces united in the American peace movement. Any antiwar organization must inform the public of its activities, publicize its programs and views and keep up with what other groups are doing. Informational propaganda is one of the most important aspects of the activities of the peace movement, and it has an interest in using press organs to disseminate its views.

The nature of relations with the media is also important because the mass media serve as a means of molding public opinion and influence American views on important political issues, and this influence is all the stronger when people have little opportunity to form opinions on the basis of their own personal experience. It is understandable that American attitudes toward the antiwar movement and the issues it raises are influenced significantly by their coverage in newspapers and magazines and on radio and television. Some commentators, such as TIME magazine reporter Bruce van Voorst, even believe that "the movement depends on media coverage for its survival."¹

An analysis of the relations between this movement and the American mass media sheds light on the conditions under which U.S. antiwar forces operate and contributes to a better understanding of the strong and weak points of actions by organizations fighting against the threat of nuclear war.

A Contradictory Position

First of all, it is important to note that neither the media nor the antiwar movement represent a group of homogeneous forces. The peace movement now includes many organizations and groups pursuing various goals and using various tactics (from purely educational activity to non-violent demonstrations) of political struggle. They unite people of varying convictions and varying social strata.

The institution of the media is equally fragmented. It consists of tens of thousands of news organs with differing ideological and political positions,

circulation figures, audiences and other parameters. They have differing attitudes toward the peace movement as a whole and toward its various segments. In this analysis, we will focus on the national media. In terms of the influence of various institutions on the contemporary American political process, these organs are of the greatest importance to any political force, including the peace movement.

Their detailed and regular coverage of national and world issues distinguishes them from local news organs and even from many regional ones; their reports are disseminated in one way or another throughout the country and abroad; their information is addressed to the general public and to the political elite, which generally trust the news they report. Besides this, these sources also serve as "opinion leaders" for other press organs in the country, setting the tone of information and largely determining the particular news items that warrant attention. The national media are not only an extremely important source of information for millions of Americans; foreign views on the state of affairs in the United States are often based precisely on their reports.

The majority of national media--the CBS, NBC and ABC television and radio corporations, the NEW YORK TIMES and WASHINGTON POST newspapers and TIME and NEWSWEEK magazines--are closely connected with the particular segments of the dominant class with liberal-centrist views.² The attitude of these press organs toward the peace movement reflects the interests of this group and depends largely on its views on such cardinal issues as Soviet-American relations and arms control.

The approach of the liberal-centrist media to these matters is distinguished by a specific combination of features. On the one hand, anti-Sovietism and anticommunist opinions are an invariable attribute of American bourgeois liberal views on matters connected with Soviet-American relations. This means that these news organs never miss an opportunity to underscore (or even exaggerate) conflicts in these relations, participate eagerly in (or even initiate) ideological, political and propaganda campaigns and foment hostility in their readers and viewers toward the Soviet Union, its policies and its social structure.

On the other hand, most representatives of this segment of the media are disgusted by the conservatives' characteristic black-and-white view of the world and they do not regard the Soviet Union and the socialist world as the only source of "universal evil." Many of them are well aware of the danger of an unbridled arms race and the exacerbation of relations with the Soviet Union. For this reason, the liberal-centrist media as a whole do not deny the possibility of cooperation with the USSR, especially in matters of arms control, because they realize that this is literally a matter of life and death; at the same time, every effort is made to keep the USSR from gaining a better image in the United States. In other words, the media and the groups behind them are willing to cooperate with the USSR, but only on a minimal scale and with no changes in the fundamentally anticommunist principles of the U.S. approach to relations between the two sociopolitical systems. This kind of ideological and political outlook is closely related to the type of political thinking that was so aptly defined as liberal-technocratic by Soviet researcher B. V. Mikhaylov--

a type of thinking which is quite characteristic of many sensible members of the U.S. ruling class.³ In our analysis of the liberal-centrist media's attitude toward the peace movement, we will also discuss the views of the forces whose interests and opinions are reflected in the media.

First of all, we should note that one important aspect of the liberal-centrist national media's attitude toward the peace movement is colored by the media's position as a simultaneously political and commercial institution. This is reflected in two ways. On the one hand, the media seek an audience by concentrating (and causing the reader to concentrate) on sensational news items, novelty, melodramatic events, conflicts and the actions of famous people, and this largely determines their choice of subject matter and the accuracy with which they cover these events. At the same time, performing the functions of an "early warning system" and an information agent for the ruling class as a whole, the media must display a certain degree of objectivity or they will be simply unable to satisfy the information needs of the U.S. political elite.

This is the reason for the contradictory position of the liberal-centrist media in their attitude toward the peace movement.⁴

An Unexpected Result

To some degree, we could say that influential news organs helped to create the necessary conditions for the peace movement's growth into a mass movement. Furthermore, however paradoxical it may seem, the unprecedented scales of the peace movement were a direct, although unexpected, result of the broad campaign against the "Soviet military threat" that was conducted more or less continuously throughout the second half of the 1970's. The campaign had its calmer moments, but it also had peaks, particularly during the last 2 years of Carter's term and then during the entire period of the Reagan Administration.

All of the news organs we are examining took an active part in the escalation of this campaign, sometimes by simply "sanctifying" it with their authority. Their participation, however, was relatively (in comparison to, for example, the position of a conservative national newspaper such as the WALL STREET JOURNAL) "moderate" and had a fairly limited aim, namely the creation of a consensus (or common opinion) in favor of the buildup of American military strength in principle, the guarantee of a tougher line in relations with the USSR, the neutralization of the hopes connected with detente and the "spoilage" of ideas about the Soviet Union, which had improved during the period of detente's greatest success. The results of these efforts were pronounced "positive" by the liberal-centrist media.

But the escalation of broad-scale anti-Soviet campaigns, particularly those connected with matters of U.S. national security, does not always occur according to plan and is not always controlled wholly by the campaigns' initiators. The campaign against the "Soviet threat," during the course of which anti-Soviet attacks and arguments were often deliberately melodramatized and were calculated to stir up emotions and to intimidate people, acquired a self-generating, irrational nature and had some results that were undesirable for some of its participants. In the case of the liberal-centrist media, these

results were the disruption of the anticipated enactment of the SALT II treaty and the arrival of the Reagan Administration--the most extremist of all the postwar administrations, and one which took an extremely negative view of arms control and which increased military spending far beyond the bounds of common sense.

At the same time, the escalation of fear of "external threats" led unavoidably to openly reactionary trends in domestic policy, including some with a direct effect on the interests of some segments of ruling circles. For example, the Reagan Administration took several measures to limit the traditional privileges of the media. In this way, the campaign regarding the "Soviet military threat," in which the liberal-centrist media played an active part, weakened their own position.

In addition, the campaign forced millions of Americans to pay the closest attention to the problems of war and peace and the state of Soviet-American relations. The dramatic intensification of the campaign under Ronald Reagan eventually had a result Washington did not anticipate: It stimulated a strong reaction in the form of widespread anti-imperialist feelings.

There is no question that one of the catalysts in the growth of the peace movement was the group of openly belligerent plans and statements of the White House, Pentagon and State Department, which were reported by the media to each reader and viewer. But this was not all. Many inexperienced Americans simply might not have realized what was "bad," for example, about the White House's plans to win a nuclear war, might not have known about the possible consequences of a "show" of nuclear strength in Europe and might not have understood the Europeans' extremely negative feelings about this prospect if these matters had not been covered in detail by the mass media. The liberal-centrist media, which do not agree with the administration on many issues, made a great effort to present discerning analyses of the militaristic views and statements of U.S. leaders so that Americans could develop negative feelings about them. For example, there was the series of controversial interviews with top members of the administration by LOS ANGELES TIMES reporter Robert Scheer.⁵ The conversations in which government officials took the liberty of expressing monstrous opinions about the possibility and acceptability of nuclear war, particularly the statement that "with enough shovels" much of the population could escape nuclear death, aroused the most lively debates in the media, were the subject of editorials and discussions by influential columnists, etc.⁶ It is obvious that the elucidation of administration policy on these matters in a primarily negative light considerably augmented the Americans' feelings of fear.

In this way, after inspiring concern about the unbridled arms race for many years, the authoritative national media stimulated, either directly or indirectly and either willingly or unwillingly, a broad American movement against the mounting threat of nuclear war under the Reagan Administration.

But this was not the only way in which the media influenced the peace movement. A negative result of this influence was that the lengthy anti-Soviet campaign took its toll on the opinions of people who had initially participated

enthusiastically in the struggle against the nuclear threat. When renowned public opinion expert Louis Harris was interviewed by the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, he said that a clear majority of Americans favored a nuclear freeze, arms limitation agreements and the overall improvement of American-Soviet relations, but he also cited the following data: 80 percent regard the USSR as a nation hostile to the United States; 78 percent agreed (7 percent disagreed) with the statement that the USSR "wants to conclude agreements only if it can benefit from them"; 75 percent "do not trust the USSR to abide by agreements" (21 percent did trust the USSR). For the sake of comparison, Harris said that in 1976 (at the beginning of the new round of warnings about the "Soviet threat") only 69 percent of all the Americans polled regarded the Soviet Union as "a hostile power."⁷

In other words, propaganda has stirred up anti-Soviet feelings in recent years. Many popular beliefs about the Soviet Union are fully consistent with American propaganda stereotypes (this is attested to by the very wording of the questions discussed above). Consequently, the opinions of many members of the peace movement were formed under the influence of bourgeois propaganda cliches, and the growth of antiwar feelings in the United States, which are objectively contrary to the views of the Reagan Administration, has been accompanied by the simultaneous growth of mistrust in Soviet policy. Both were in the interests of the liberal-centrist media and affected their attitude toward the movement.

It is also significant that completely respectable, "non-radical" institutions and individuals initiated the current phase of the peace movement, and this gave the media more cause to sympathize with its aims. "The movement's leaders are not bearded radicals, but members of the middle class, middle-aged men and women, many of whom are customarily engaged in responsible and prestigious undertakings. They are physicians, attorneys, nurses, scientists, teachers and clergymen. They are not fighting their main battles in the streets, but in sermons and lectures, in books and brochures," Fox Butterfield, the head of the NEW YORK TIMES agency in Boston, wrote in his collective description of the members of a "moderate," "responsible" and even "ideal" (in the view of centrist groups) public movement.⁸

Finally, the position of the media was also influenced by the fact that the growth of the mass movement was "newsworthy." It had to be observed and reported even before its scales and its political, ideological and organizational features became definite.

Therefore, at the time when the contemporary peace movement was just beginning to gather strength, it fit into an acceptable ideological framework and customary professional boundaries for the liberal journalistic establishment. Furthermore, some journalists were also disturbed by the state of international relations and therefore sympathized with the movement's aims and ideals.

Around fall 1981 the movement became the object of constant press coverage. There were fairly detailed and frequent reports on debates organized in American universities by the Union of Concerned Scientists, the resolutions passed by municipal assemblies and local legislatures in the New England states in support of a U.S.-USSR nuclear freeze in spring 1982, the events of "Epicenter Week,"

the demonstration of 12 June 1982 in New York and several other, less prominent events. The significance of the broad media coverage of these events, particularly during the early stages of the movement, should not be underestimated, especially in view of the fact that a climate conducive to the spread of antimilitarist feelings was created in the country. Activists from California admitted that they got the idea of a nuclear freeze from newspaper reports that Americans in three electoral districts in Massachusetts had approved a freeze initiative in 1980.⁹ Therefore, the press was able to accomplish much that the initiators of the campaign were incapable of doing on their own: It made local events national and thereby gave many groups and organizations throughout the country common aims. In turn, the spread of the campaign for a U.S.-USSR nuclear freeze gave the media a pretext to cover more and more new events, setting off a kind of chain reaction in which the spread of information generated new information.

There is no question that a special role was played by television as the most widespread, popular and accessible medium. Howard Cohn, the author of a long article about TV coverage of the danger of nuclear war and the growth of the peace movement, noted that a Harris poll in October 1981 indicated that the threat of nuclear war was among the 10 chief matters of concern to Americans and explained that this had also been the case in the past, but "television news programs now reflect this concern more clearly than ever before. In November 1981 the evening news included more than 20 stories about the threat of nuclear war and about antiwar protests in Europe."¹⁰ Another 85 such reports were televised between March and June 1982. Furthermore, around 10 discussions of the matter had been televised: These were debates on arms control and the possible effects of nuclear war and interviews with leaders of the peace movement.¹¹

Therefore, at one time under a specific set of circumstances, what the Americans term the "establishment" press objectively promoted the peace movement and--whether it intended to or not--enlightened millions of Americans with regard to the realities of the danger of nuclear war and gave them a chance to see vivid proof (television's capabilities in this respect are colossal!) of the degree to which Europeans were disturbed by Ronald Reagan's dangerous militarist plans.

But this is only one side of the matter. The media's support of the peace movement, as we will see below, was quite limited.

Different Aspects of the Media

One of the most important results of the growth of the peace movement was its support by fairly broad segments of the foreign policy establishment: not only people like G. Kennan and P. Warnke, who had consistently favored decisive steps in the area of arms control, but also several politicians who had always been "hawks," such as W. Colby, M. Bundy and J. Schlesinger. The movement stimulated a search for alternatives to Reagan's military and foreign policy in general, reinstated arms control as the main issue in American politics and considerably reinforced the position of supporters of a constructive approach to this matter in ruling circles by giving them a definite trump card in encounters with the administration.

It was precisely this, judging by the position of the liberal-centrist media, that should have constituted the main purpose and final goal of the movement against the danger of nuclear war. Decisions on specific matters, however, should be left, according to the media, to politicians and experts. But just as in other cases, the press could not control all of the results of its activity. The movement certainly did not intend to confine its functions to the role it had been relegated by the media. As time went on, its position began to display increasingly distinct elements that were far from satisfactory to the forces whose views were expressed by the liberal-centrist media.

These elements included the following. First of all, the very idea of a nuclear freeze includes a demand for the cessation of the arms race in general, whereas the opposite demand for the modernization and buildup of weapons is virtually an axiom for the groups to which the liberal-centrist media belong. Secondly, many segments of the movement view disarmament as the ideal state, whereas press organs view the main goal as the mere de-escalation of the arms race and the stabilization of the "balance of terror" on a lower level. Thirdly, the very spread of this kind of mass democratic movement and the invasion of the inner sanctum of world politics and the cherished privileges of experts and technocrats by average citizens put these groups on the alert. Fourthly, they have been deeply disturbed by the growing awareness among members of the movement that curbing the arms race will be impossible without the overall improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, a better understanding of its motives and the recognition of its legal interests. Fifthly, attempts to establish contact and coordinate actions with the antiwar movement in Western Europe also seem excessive and dangerous to these groups. All of these positions are interrelated, and their increasing popularity is certainly not in the interest of ruling circles.

This is precisely why the liberal-centrist media are doing everything within their power to exert the proper ideological and political pressure on the peace movement and on the specific segments of their audience which have not joined the movement yet, but might do so in the future. These press organs are trying to put the movement under the control of the political forces whose interests they represent.

Opportunities for this kind of control are found primarily in the categorization of news items. What should be reported, how it should be reported, and what aspects of the reports should be underplayed or even ignored. The way in which antinuclear protests and the ideas of the peace movement are reported and interpreted in the press and on television is not only a result of the conscious efforts of media executives or even the ideological and political preferences and biases of journalists. It is largely predetermined by the distinctive features of the media and the professional methods of reporters and editors--for example, the criteria governing decisions about which events should be depicted as "news" and which information meets rigid standards and can compete with other potential items in a news program or publication. These hard and fast rules have resulted in the deliberate and spontaneous creation of specific beliefs, "images" of the peace movement, cliches in reports on the movement, and standard opinions cultivated in a huge audience by the liberal-centrist media.

How do the liberal-centrist media portray the peace movement?

First of all, we must frankly say that press organs do not provide daily, systematic, in-depth and thorough coverage of the peace movement. They generally focus on striking and dramatic events: demonstrations, direct confrontations between activists and authorities and arrests. This is primarily due to the media's preference for sensational news items and it affects many aspects of their attitude toward the peace movement.

The events of the beginning of this decade corroborate this statement. At that time young Americans were protesting the Carter Administration's decision on registration for the draft and there were public demonstrations in Utah and Nevada against the plans to locate MX missiles there. These movements were relatively local and had strictly limited aims, but they were popular and emotional and they therefore attracted the attention of the media. At the same time, several organizations in the New England states were conducting almost imperceptible but quite serious ideological and organizational work to lay the bases for the nuclear freeze campaign. It was "unnoticed" by the media, even though the freeze issue was discussed (and rejected) at the Democratic Party convention in summer 1980. In this way, the media simply failed to attach importance to a political phenomenon with far-reaching implications. The subsequent spread of the movement for a nuclear freeze was unexpected by the national media and took them by surprise.

The media's emphasis on sensational news stories was still present when the movement was already gathering strength, but it had a slightly different impact under these conditions. The coverage of the incident involving Norman Mayer in December 1982 was quite indicative. He threatened to blow up the George Washington Monument in the American capital if his demands for a number of antiwar actions were not fulfilled. For several days, this incident was a matter of extraordinary interest to the media. It is indicative that the liberal-centrist media did not treat Mayer as an ordinary sensation-seeker and even appeared to sympathize to some degree with his motives. What is more, journalists made no overt attempts to associate Mayer with the peace movement as a whole. His action, which was absolutely uncharacteristic of the behavior of the overwhelming majority of peace movement activists, was given much more coverage than, for example, a convention of the Coalition for a Nuclear Freeze, which has millions of members, which was held a little later and at which important decisions were adopted.

This kind of emphasis can objectively give people a distorted view of the tactics and nature of the antinuclear movement. At the same time, since media attention is important to members of protest demonstrations, this emphasis on sensational news has stimulated the organization of "impressive" actions, calculated to promote coverage in the press and capable of sometimes detracting from educational and political work on the local level.

In the broader context, the fragmentary coverage of the movement testifies that the media's reactions do not depend at all on the importance of the issues raised. It is true that the current peace movement can definitely be regarded as a "historically new phenomenon and an enormous opportunity for mankind,"

as the joint statement of the CPSU and FCP said.¹² But the American liberal-centrist media regard it and cover it as a large but quite customary movement in support of a single aim, depicting it as a typical pressure group and as just one of many such groups. Richard Pollack, the author of an interesting article about the interpretation of questions of war and peace in leading U.S. press organs, made the sarcastic comment that the NEW YORK TIMES editors assign more reporters to cover sports events than the peace movement.¹³

Another feature of the media's attitude toward the movement is that although they recognize the sincerity of its members' motives and the positive value of the arousal of public interest in arms control, they are also quite eager to discuss the "incompetence" of the movement's members in matters of military strategy. Editorials and other articles reflecting the editors' opinions in many news organs (THE NEW YORK TIMES, TIME and others) use this pretext to criticize the idea of the nuclear freeze, which is the most popular idea in today's movement. The following TIME magazine statement is fairly typical:

"The appeal for a freeze, which sounds so simple and reasonable and reflects all the fear of the prospect of nuclear war, played an important role as a pretext for legislative activity. At the same time, the very simplicity of the idea of the freeze--the immediate cessation of bomb production--keeps it from meeting the diplomatic and technical requirements of arms control. Some representatives of the movement have even admitted that their real aim, particularly after the start of the talks in Geneva, is not so much a freeze as the exertion of pressure on an administration that does not want to make concessions in these talks. In this respect, the campaign for the nuclear freeze can be a noble and even praiseworthy endeavor, but only if it does not succeed."¹⁴

It is indicative that the views of "some"--obviously, the most moderate--"representatives of the movement" are singled out. The more consistent supporters of the revision of deterrence concepts and supporters of disarmament, on the other hand, are called "naive idealists" and "people who have lost touch with reality" by the media, and their ideas are either not taken seriously or are ignored altogether. One NEW YORK TIMES reader who wrote a letter to the editors in response to an article about the mental state of today's students (which said that they were more conservative than in the 1960's) remarked: "In general, the mass media are not paying attention to organized grass-roots and national progressive groups opposing American policies. The media's interpretation of political activity on 'once radical campuses' reinforces the belief that these groups simply do not exist. This will ultimately reduce the range of 'acceptable' topics for political discussion in American life at a time when what the country needs is the exact opposite."¹⁵

The liberal-centrist media's doubts about the ability of "non-professionals" to make sensible decisions on matters of military strategy and their arrogant contempt for "non-traditional" ideas and theories have gradually shifted the emphasis in movement coverage from the public to the elite level. This trend was apparent quite early, at the beginning of 1982 (when the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze resolution was introduced in the Senate), and it became the prevailing tendency after the demonstration of 12 June 1982 in New York. After this

huge demonstration, which also marked the peak of the press coverage of the mass grass-roots movement, media descriptions of these actions became more restrained, even to the detriment of the need for sensationalism.

During the 1982 congressional campaign, the freeze attracted attention primarily as a Democratic Party campaign slogan, and this clearly reflected the liberal-centrist media's close ties with the Democrats. If, on the other hand, we analyze news items for 1983, we could conclude that the movement had almost disappeared by this time and that all of its activity was confined primarily to debates in the House of Representatives on the freeze resolution and to the adoption of the Catholic bishops' pastoral message. Both of these events were important, but they were far from the only milestones in the movement's activity.

Here is a clear example. New York's leftist-liberal VILLAGE VOICE printed a calendar of antiwar events in New York for April 1983.¹⁶ Demonstrations, seminars and films were scheduled for virtually each day. Judging by reports in THE NEW YORK TIMES, however, there was no perceptible antiwar activity in the city at that time. Even an event of such major importance as National Disarmament Day on 20 June 1983 was not given the attention it warranted.

At the same time, THE NEW YORK TIMES had much to say--most of it quite negative--about Reagan's approach to the Geneva talks with the Soviet Union and reported all of the criticism of the administration by U.S. politicians and members of European governments. Here is what the newspaper had to say in an editorial about the congressional debates on the MX missile: "Therefore, the same Congress that hypocritically demanded a nuclear freeze is now ready to vote for the MX, a powerful new missile which will escalate the arms race. Why? Because the President who buried the arms limitation treaty, who disregarded all previous plans for military organization and who chose people with a skeptical view of arms control to be on his team, has now said that he needs the MX for the establishment of arms control."¹⁷ We repeat, these words were printed in a newspaper opposed to the freeze.

The mass media's attempts to "tame" the U.S. peace movement by carefully filtering and preparing news items are reflected in more than just direct descriptions of the movement. There are other issues connected with the interests of the American peace movement--for example, the antimissile movement in Europe; many Americans, particularly the average citizen, acquire most of their information and ideas about these issues from the liberal-centrist media. But the media have been quite ambiguous in their reports on the European struggle. For example, the press and television have given this subject as much coverage as the American movement, but here is an extremely indicative excerpt from an article about a large peace demonstration in Bonn: "The rally took place in an atmosphere of German nationalism and attacks on the United States. The demonstration became the focal point of neutralist, anti-American trends developing in West Germany. These trends were strengthened by the blows detente sustained from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the situation in Poland. There has also been an obvious reluctance in certain segments of the FRG population to revise the relationship with the Soviet Union that took shape during the period of minimal tension in the 1970's."¹⁸

Aside from the obvious misinterpretation of the reasons for the antiwar movement in the FRG, it is clear that these references to the "neutralism" and "anti-Americanism" of its activists (the newspaper is clearly guilty of an extremely oversimplified account of this event) are calculated to have a negative effect on American minds. It is true that some useful information can be gained from this particular article and similar ones, but this requires the "ability to read" the newspaper--a skill which is generally within the power of experts and professionals but is rarely found in the average reader.

This quotation also clearly indicates the basic premises of the media's approach to the state of Soviet-American relations, to an issue directly related to the activities of antiwar forces in the United States. However harshly the Reagan Administration might be criticized at times, the underlying assumption in all such media reports is that American military and foreign policy is of a peaceful and defensive nature. Given this approach, administration activity is depicted as something dictated by U.S. defense needs, however falsely they might be interpreted, or, in more "radical" cases, as a temporary aberration from the "constant striving" of the United States for peace.

It is no secret that critical and seemingly critical statements about the administration are accompanied by many anti-Soviet propaganda campaigns, such as the ones sparked by the events in Poland or the South Korean airliner incident. These campaigns, which create an atmosphere of anti-Soviet hysteria, have an indisputable effect on members of the peace movement and on public opinion in general, and this is obviously to the benefit of the Reagan Administration.

Between the Hammer and the Anvil

Let us summarize our conclusions. The peace movement and its major concerns are covered by the media from the vantage point of the liberal-centrist establishment. The strategic aims of this consist in imposing establishment ideas on the movement, neutralizing its more consistent elements and using its power to increase possible opposition to the Reagan Administration's extremist line in the upper echelons of government. Here there is not even a trace of the new line of reasoning for the nuclear age, the line advised by Albert Einstein, or of the humanitarian thinking so energetically promoted by peace activists of our day, but there are attempts to update the old theories of "intimidation" and "deterrence" and to make them seem less dangerous to the public. There is also an obvious desire to de-escalate and stabilize the arms race; and this desire is so much more realistic than the Reagan Administration's wish for military superiority to the USSR.

This position midway between the peace movement and the militarist administration, which is so contradictory and yet so natural for the liberal-centrist media, is invested with a number of long-range opportunities. Above all, there is the search for the optimal, from the vantage point of these groups, level of cooperation with the Soviet Union in the reduction of the danger of nuclear war.

All of this, however, also presupposes an eclectic position. The liberal-centrist media are at the service of "both us and you" and simultaneously "neither us nor you." They must pay for this inconsistency by sometimes working against their own specific political interests and contributing more than they want to the shifting "balance of power" within the United States. These paradoxes and contradictions could be resolved by political developments, depending on the course of domestic politics in the United States, the state of Soviet-American relations and the degree of agreement and disagreement with NATO allies.

As for the peace movement's attitude toward the media, it acts primarily "from a position of strength." It rests on a broad social base and is well organized on the local level and somewhat organized on the national level. Besides this, it has its own communicative infrastructure: It publishes books, magazines and bulletins, makes movies and enlists the services of writers and artists. In other words, it can reach the masses without the use of the traditional information networks. Therefore, although the attention of the national liberal-centrist media is still of great importance to the movement, the latter has no need to go to any lengths to gain this attention or to put up a false front to meet media standards of behavior. In this respect, it is less vulnerable to manipulation than, for instance, the peace movement of the Vietnam War years.

Furthermore, the strength of the American peace movement is compounded by the fact that it is acting in unison with all other world forces working toward the preservation of human civilization.

FOOTNOTES

1. FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1982, p 93.
2. A detailed analysis of the political features of these leading bourgeois press organs can be found in the article "The White House and the Mass Media" in issue No 1 for 1983--Editor's note.
3. See the chapter in the collective work "Sovremennoye politicheskoye soznaniye v SShA" [Present-Day Political Awareness in the United States], Moscow, 1980, pp 66-122, and B. V. Mikhaylov, "Sovremennyy amerikanskiy liberalizm: ideologiya i politika" [Contemporary American Liberalism: Ideology and Policy], Moscow, 1983, pp 32-64.
4. This discussion of the media's "attitude" toward the movement presupposes some kind of prevailing opinion, but, in the first place, each organ has its own political ideology and, in the second place, each can contain articles contrary to this prevailing opinion.
5. These interviews became the basis of R. Scheer's book "With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War," N.Y., 1982. For a digest of this book, see issue No 2, 1984.

6. For the sake of objectivity, we must say that the reports of R. Scheer, which were highly professional, did not divulge any secrets and did not say anything new in comparison, for example, to what NATION magazine had to say about the dangerous nature of U.S. military doctrines. But it was precisely the articles in a paper as well known as THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, and not in more "leftist" publications, that aroused emotional responses and heightened public concern.
7. THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, August-September 1982, p 4.
8. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 11 July 1982, p 14.
9. THE NATION, 1 May 1982, p 523.
10. TV GUIDE, 15-21 January 1983, p 8.
11. Ibid., p 6.
12. PRAVDA, 13 July 1983.
13. THE NATION, 1 May 1982, p 518.
14. TIME, 21 March 1983, p 29.
15. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 November 1981.
16. THE VILLAGE VOICE, 5 April 1983.
17. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 25 May 1983.
18. Ibid., 11 October 1981.

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UNITED STATES, NATO AND EAST-WEST TRADE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 22 Mar 84) pp 44-50

[Article by A. V. Kunitsyn; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Recently the leaders of the United States and other NATO countries have put on a great show of satisfaction with the agreement of Western states on matters of trade and economic relations with the socialist countries. This is particularly true of Washington, where people are alleging that the West has finally completed the full-scale revision of its economic policy in relations with socialist states in order to bring it in line with U.S. military-political strategy and to coordinate a single approach to trade with the East.

Commenting on the results of the December (1983) NATO Council session which authorized the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe, London's TIMES remarked: "The North Atlantic bloc believes it can now negotiate with the USSR from a position of strength on matters concerning political dialogue, economic relations and balanced disarmament." The final communique of the session frankly said: "Bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union and the East European countries should continue to be coordinated with the allies' problems with security in the broader context. This means, in particular, that they must avoid dependence on the Soviet Union and must not aid in strengthening Soviet military potential. For this reason, the West must be encouraged to develop its own energy resources. To avoid the further use of certain forms of trade by the Soviet Union for the purpose of building up its military strength, the allies should continue to display vigilance in their constant analysis of security-related aspects of East-West economic relations."

What do these statements actually mean and how should they be interpreted in light of the present state of these relations?

After announcing its "crusade" against world socialism, the Reagan Administration made an effort to bury detente and undermine mutually beneficial cooperation between the East and West. Foreign economic policy occupies a prominent place in U.S. strategy in general. The American administration is trying to convince its NATO partners that the development of trade and economic relations with the USSR and other socialist states would be "unwise" and even "dangerous."

People in the White House believe it is a self-evident fact that the CEMA countries are deriving important strategic advantages from their purchase of Western equipment and technology. Consequently, trade with them, in Washington's opinion, inflicts strategic injuries on the West because it helps to strengthen the economy and military power of a "potential adversary." At the same time, American ruling circles cannot give up their old dreams of using trade for their own political purposes. They have even expressed their willingness to promote economic cooperation in exchange for the "satisfactory behavior" of socialist states in international affairs and in the sphere of domestic policy.

Describing current trends in imperialist policy, Yu. V. Andropov stressed that "the most militant groups are now more active in the West, groups whose class hatred for socialism overrides their sense of reality, and sometimes even their common sense. The imperialists are not giving up their plans for economic warfare against the socialist countries and intervention in their internal affairs in the hope of undermining their social order and are striving to attain military superiority to the USSR and all of the countries of the socialist community."*

The present U.S. administration associates its far-reaching plans with a coordinated Western economic policy in relations with the countries of the socialist community. In this way, Washington hopes to intensify the West's political and economic influence on these countries, secure a leading role for the United States in the capitalist states' economic relations with the socialist countries, unite the West on the basis of American views and secure the interests of American monopolies in East-West economic relations. For this purpose, in the 1980's the United States exerted stronger pressure on its allies through NATO, OECD, GATT, IMF and some other international organizations (where it plays the deciding role) for the coordination of a single set of conditions for economic transactions with socialist countries. According to American government experts, a coordinated Western economic policy could produce the best results in such fields as the export of modern equipment and technology, as well as currency and credit measures and debt problems.

Washington strategists have assigned NATO the leading role in the drafting of plans for economic warfare against the socialist countries. There were several reasons for this choice. The main one was the political purpose of the North Atlantic alliance, whose activities are governed by the objectives of confrontation with the socialist world. The NATO military-political bloc is being rejuvenated by the atmosphere of international tension. For this reason, many American ideas and proposals with the aim of sustaining military-political confrontation and of undermining the positions of socialist states have won the approval and support of NATO bureaucrats. The second reason is the political machinery of the North Atlantic alliance, in which the United States plays the dominant role. Since the time of its founding, NATO has been an organization designed to impose Pentagon military-political doctrines on its members and

* Yu. V. Andropov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1983, p 15.

has served as the main channel of political influence on the allies. The third reason is that NATO gives American diplomacy chances to make economic relations conditional upon military and political issues, which transfers any discussion of East-West trade from the sphere of international cooperation to the sphere of confrontation.

In this context, we should recall the energetic attempts to use NATO as a means of involving West European states in the economic confrontation with the USSR that was undertaken by the U.S. administration in 1980 in connection with the events in Afghanistan. In 1982 similar attempts were made in connection with the declaration of martial law in Poland. In a "Statement on the Events in Poland," participants in a special meeting of the NATO foreign ministers (January 1982) presented a fairly long list of short- and long-term measures the NATO countries were prepared to take in order to exert pressure on the socialist states. Many of these measures, however, were either not taken at all by the West European countries or were short-lived.

Sharp disagreements broke out between the United States and its partners over the participation of several West European firms in deliveries of equipment for the construction of the Soviet Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod gasline. The sanctions imposed by the Reagan Administration on the USSR, and then on French, Italian, English and West German companies, caused a serious crisis in U.S. relations with the allies. The crisis in NATO in connection with this matter reaffirmed the futility of the efforts of American ruling circles to impede objective processes in European economic affairs. It can also be regarded as proof of the political shortsightedness of the Reagan Administration, which was too busy chasing mirages of military superiority to foresee the immediate implications of its own policy.

When the attempted outright coercion of NATO partners to curtail economic contacts with the USSR failed, the U.S. administration chose more subtle methods of influence but did not give up its characteristic strong-arm tactics. It tried to overcome the dissension in NATO by means of political manipulation and the covert pressuring of allies through diplomatic channels.

At an exclusive meeting in Canada in October 1982, the NATO foreign ministers essentially agreed to conduct "an extensive series of investigations in order to surmount serious disagreements between the allies" on matters of East-West trade. In "exchange," Reagan announced the cancellation of the sanctions against the West European firms. Addressing the nation on radio on 13 November 1982, he announced that the Western countries had "reached an important agreement on a program of action" in trade with socialist states. In particular, he said that the allies had agreed "not to conclude any trade agreements that will give the USSR military or strategic advantages or will offer aid to the Soviet economy on preferential terms." The NATO countries agreed to investigate alternative suppliers of energy resources, to institute stricter control over exports of "strategic goods" to the socialist states and to prepare for the coordination of their currency and credit policy.

In accordance with the decisions of this conference, joint studies of various aspects of East-West economic relations were undertaken at the end of 1982 and

continued until fall 1983. Their purpose, according to Washington's plans, was the establishment of a conceptual basis for a long-range Western strategy and specific Western undertakings in this sphere. American diplomacy made a special effort to link this economic research as closely as possible with U.S. and NATO military and political doctrines.

The research was organized to this end as well, in such a way that the key functions in the coordination of a single Western economic policy toward socialist countries would be concentrated within the NATO framework, while other international organizations of the capitalist states would take charge of individual aspects of this subject matter. For example, the OECD began to consider ways of coordinating credit policy in relations with the USSR and other CEMA countries, based on the denial of state funding to secure credit extended to them. The International Energy Agency (IEA) supervised the study of the economic and political consequences of large-scale West European imports of natural gas and other energy resources from the USSR and of deliveries of Western equipment to our country. The discussion of American proposals regarding stronger multilateral control over exports of "strategic goods" continued in COCOM. Two general studies were conducted at the same time: one, within the OECD framework, for the purpose of a comprehensive evaluation of the present state of East-West economic relations, and another, supervised by the NATO economic directorate, for the collation of the conclusions of other organizations and the planning of a joint strategy. The assignment of coordinating functions to NATO should obviously be regarded as an expansion of bloc authority within the sphere of economic policy, which was previously limited primarily to the MILITARY-economic aspects of this policy.

Scientists, specialists and representatives of the business community from NATO countries are working with the NATO economic directorate on the elaboration of a collective Western economic strategy in relations with socialist countries. A colloquium convened by this directorate in Brussels in April 1983 made a perceptible contribution to this work.

It is indicative that conferences of this kind are held annually in NATO for the analysis of the economic development and foreign economic affairs of CEMA countries. They are attended by many prominent specialists from the United States and Western Europe. These meetings objectively promote the spread of confrontation attitudes among Western scientists and specialists engaged in the study of trade and economic relations with the East. By virtue of their subject matter and the tone of their conclusions and recommendations, the reports presented at these conferences primarily represent a search for weak spots in the economies and economic policies of the countries of the socialist community and serve the goals of confrontation. This tendentious NATO information is then used in political decisionmaking. The NATO leadership also uses it for the ideological molding of public opinion in the capitalist states.

The colloquium in 1983 was the 12th of its kind. The main topic of discussion was "The Foreign Economic Relations of CEMA Countries: Their Significance and Role on the Global Level." The ideas and recommendations voiced here were used in the preparation of a general report by NATO experts on the trade and economic relations of bloc members with the socialist states.

The preliminary results of various NATO, OECD, IEA and COCOM joint research projects were discussed at a summit-level conference of the "big seven" in Williamsburg in May 1983 and were approved in a statement by its participants. A decision was made to continue this work.

Soon afterward, in June 1983, a rough draft of the NATO report was discussed at a NATO Council session in Paris. Here, according to reports in the West European press, the strategic aspects of East-West trade and economic relations occupied a prominent place on the agenda for the first time in many years. The report was classified at the insistence of the United States, which wanted to avoid any public displays of transatlantic disagreements. But some of its conclusions, judging by reports in the Western press, were reflected in the final communique of the session.

The governments of the NATO countries were informed of the final results of the research in October 1983. Summing up the results of the 11 months of work, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs A. Wallis said in an interview that the partners had defined the "general framework" of a joint trade and economic policy in relations with socialist community countries. This was intended to supplement and reinforce NATO military-political strategy. According to Wallis, this Western policy would be based on the understanding that "they (the socialist countries--A. K.) must not be allowed to use economic relations with the West to acquire political, strategic and military advantages." In particular, he said that the Western countries had to "avoid the offer of preferential terms and subsidies,...dependence on Soviet sources of important goods and the transfer to the Russians of any equipment or technology that they might use for military purposes." The U.S. administration spokesman expressed special satisfaction with the NATO countries' "common" desire "not to let economic relations increase Soviet military potential." The chief recommendations based on the joint studies subsequently lay at the basis of the corresponding section of the final communique of the December (1983) NATO Council session.

When we evaluate all of this "research" conducted deep within NATO, we must first say that Washington's allegations about the underlying military motives of the efforts of the USSR and other CEMA countries to organize trade and economic cooperation with countries of the other social system are designed to divert attention from the well-known fact that military doctrines lie precisely at the basis of American policy in this area. As for the socialist states, their principled and consistent line of equitable cooperation with developed capitalist countries in various spheres of economics, science and technology is known to be dictated by economic and commercial considerations and by the hope of keeping the peace and consolidating peace coexistence.

How valid are the Reagan Administration's optimistic feelings about the alleged "unanimity" of NATO countries in their approach to economic relations with socialist states from a position of military and political confrontation between the two systems?

Many specialists in Western Europe and even in the United States have been quite noncommittal in their appraisals of the possibility and prospects of

a coordinated Western policy in this area. "The diverging policies of the United States, Western Europe and Japan," prominent American expert on East-West trade J. Hardt remarked, for example, in fall 1983, "presuppose caution in the prediction of a consensus on Eastern trade. What is more, even if a consensus should be reached in U.S. national legislation and in the official joint studies of the allies, the enforcement of American laws and the translation of ally AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE into an effective PRACTICAL POLICY would still run into vast differences in the approaches of Western countries to trade with the East." A similar opinion was expressed by American researchers E. Frost and A. Stent in "NATO's Problems with East-West Trade," an article published in INTERNATIONAL SECURITY magazine in summer 1983. They recalled that past "experience testifies against the West's ability to coordinate policy in this area" and noted that joint research "could help to tone down public debates but it is unlikely to resolve fundamental conflicts."

It is true that there are a number of objective obstacles standing in the way of the coordination of economic policy in relations with socialist countries. First of all, there are the conflicting interests of the main "power centers" of the capitalist world. For example, whereas the economic significance of trade with these countries is still negligible for the United States, causing economic relations to be quite heavily dependent on changes in the political situation (and political features are dominant in Washington's approach), economic factors are incomparably more important in the "Eastern policy" of the West European states, promoting more stable economic cooperation (to some degree, this last statement also applies to Japan). This difference will apparently continue to exist in the foreseeable future. There is another matter in which there is no unanimity among NATO partners. Whereas the West European states regard this trade as a normal and desirable element of international relations, the United States is inclined to view it as some kind of "favor" to the socialist countries. "Ideally, Western Europe would like to preserve the existing system," E. Frost and A. Stent write. "The Americans, on the other hand, at least those in power, would like to make radical changes in it."

There are other reasons for the differences between official American and West European assessments of East-West trade. For example, the United States is still a RELATIVELY self-sufficient country with a large and diversified domestic market, which can compensate to some degree for the administration's restrictive policy on trade with socialist states. But for the West European countries, whose economies are quite dependent on foreign trade, exports represent a vitally important element. Their governments regard reliable export markets as an organically necessary component for the healthy development of their national economies and one of the prerequisites for domestic social stability. For this reason, the West European states have consistently emphasized exports, despite all of the changes in their political leadership.

This is even acknowledged in the United States when trade with socialist countries is discussed. For example, the 20 November 1983 issue of the WALL STREET JOURNAL said: "In the FRG, where almost a third of all goods and services are exported, trade with the Soviet Union is small in volume but important." The newspaper stated that although the volume of FRG trade with

the USSR is only one-third as great as its trade with the United States, many West German firms attach great importance to commercial relations with the East. When FRG Foreign Minister H. D. Genscher addressed the New York Security Research Institute in September 1983, he stressed: "We recognize the important stabilizing effect--on East-West political relations--of broader economic cooperation, but naturally with a view to economically sound considerations and our own strategic interests. The tendency to think in terms of trade warfare generates antagonism; it...indicates the misinterpretation of past experience. Foreign economic policy must not be used as an instrument of foreign policy regulation."

This naturally brings to mind the internal contradictions of current U.S. trade policy. On the one hand, the Reagan Administration is urging partners to coordinate a single policy because it realizes that it cannot attain its goals in this area without the support of the allies, but on the other it sees the main purpose of this policy as a means of exerting pressure on the Soviet Union, with absolutely no consideration for the interests of the West European states. Under these conditions, serious disagreements between Atlantic partners are unavoidable.

There is also definite "asymmetry" in the American and West European varieties of the differentiated approach to economic relations with East European CEMA countries. The present U.S. administration is inclined to take the bloc approach and is conducting a tougher trade and credit policy in relations with socialist community countries. A report prepared in May 1983 by specialists from the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, "Technology and East-West Trade," says, for example, that there is "some evidence that the entire policy of differentiation has recently existed more in theory than in practice, and that all of Eastern Europe is now viewed--especially by the Defense Department (of the United States--A. K.)--in much the same way as the USSR in matters of export control." On the other hand, the political interests of the West European states and their objective interest in large-scale economic cooperation motivate them to approach relations with East European countries with great care.

These factors naturally limit the ability of the United States and NATO to use economic contacts for the attainment of political and military-strategic goals. Furthermore, the policy line of the Reagan Administration is even being opposed by a large part of the American business community. These business groups believe, the WASHINGTON POST reported on 16 November 1983, that "the rigid trade restrictions are hurting America's economy more than they are helping its security." American businessmen are justifiably worried that this line could have an adverse effect on their overseas operations. For example, they assert that many West European firms maintaining commercial contacts with the CEMA countries are already trying to limit the use of American parts and equipment for their own protection in the event of new U.S. "sanctions." Other firms are demanding delivery guarantees or the promise to cover losses resulting from the delay or cessation of American deliveries. This raises the costs of U.S. firms and reduces their competitive potential.

The countries of the socialist community are counterbalancing the American policy of discrimination and diktat in international economic relations with

a policy of broader and deeper mutually beneficial cooperation among states with differing social structures. Addressing the Seventh Session of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council, Chairman N. A. Tikhonov of the USSR Council of Ministers, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, stressed that "commercial cooperation is not a matter of taste or feelings; it is primarily a matter of good sense and mutual responsibility. If we agree that there is no reasonable alternative to peaceful coexistence by states at the present time, we must admit that its stability and reliability will depend largely on broad-scale economic cooperation."*

The position of the Soviet Government was reaffirmed at the Ninth Session of the Tenth USSR Supreme Soviet (December 1983), at which time the plan for the economic and social development of the country in 1984 was ratified. It reflects our invariable policy line of stronger trade and economic ties with the developed capitalist states expressing an interest in cooperation with the USSR. Proceeding from the fundamental premises of this policy, the countries of the socialist community are also still in favor of trade and economic cooperation with the United States, but only cooperation based on equality, mutual benefit, the observance of contractual obligations and the renunciation of discrimination and the practice of making mutual trade conditional upon unrelated issues.

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* VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA SSSR, 1983, No 3, p 15.

1984 MILITARY BUDGET SETS DANGEROUS RECORD

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 22 Mar 84) pp 61-68

[Article by Yu. A. Ivanov]

[Text] Now that debates, embellished with campaign considerations, on military appropriations for the coming fiscal year have commenced within the walls of the Capitol, it would be good to take a backward look and analyze how the 1984 military budget was debated and adopted. The bill on military appropriations for fiscal year 1984, which had begun a month and a half before, on 1 October, was passed on the last day of the 98th Congress' first session, on 18 November 1983. For more than 9 months prior to this event, the size of the military budget and of the sums needed to finance the Reagan Administration's massive arms buildup program was debated in the Capitol. The discussion of the military budget in the Congress almost always leads to disagreements over the division of the Pentagon's "pie" among various monopolies and states. There was no shortage of this kind of disagreement this year either, but this time a distinctive feature of the congressional debates was the preoccupation with the size of the "pie."

In the draft FY 84 budget submitted to Congress on the last day of January last year, the administration requested 274 billion dollars in military appropriations just for the Pentagon. Besides this, several military programs are being carried out by other departments or are covered by other budget items. The sum requested by the administration would have meant an increase of 10 percent in military spending (adjusted to cover inflation) over the previous fiscal year.

People in the White House apparently realized that at a time when the country was experiencing the most severe economic recession since the 1930's and when 12 million people had lost their jobs, but the draft budget envisaged a deficit of 200 billion, the proposal of this kind of unprecedented sum for military needs would arouse opposition in the nation and in the Congress. A diversionary tactic was employed: The administration announced that the President himself had asked the Pentagon to make all possible reductions in its requests and that the draft military budget for fiscal year 1984 had been cut by 8 billion dollars and military requests for the next 5 years had been cut by 55 billion.

This maneuver, however, did not produce the anticipated results. On the very first day of the congressional hearings on the draft budget, Chairman J. Whitten (Democrat, Mississippi) of the House Committee on Appropriations made the ironic comment that in comparison to the 1.77 trillion dollars the administration plans to spend on weapons during the same 5 years, the figure of 55 billion is negligible. Even in the armed services committees of both houses, which have always been sympathetic to Pentagon requests, things did not go smoothly this time. The February hearings indicated serious congressional opposition to the President's proposed rate of increase in military spending.

The overwhelming majority of Democrats advocated cuts in Reagan's requests. For example, Senator C. Levin from Michigan, a member of the Committee on the Armed Services, had this to say about the draft military budget: "The question is not whether we will cut it, but by how much and in which sections." Criticism of the inordinate sums requested for military purposes was even voiced by Republicans. In particular, back at the end of January cuts were advocated on television by Chairman P. Domenici (New Mexico) of the Senate Budget Committee. Commenting on congressional reactions to the draft budget, the NEW YORK TIMES remarked on 2 February: "The questions and concerns of Republicans indicate that Reagan might have only the partial support of his own party."¹

When the House Budget Committee began work in February 1983, several specific military budget cuts were proposed. Chairman J. Addabbo (Democrat, New York) of the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations proposed a 30 billion dollar reduction of these expenditures from the administrations plans. Chairman of the House Budget Committee J. Jones (Democrat, Oklahoma) favored an increase.

The administration, however, refused to make any concessions whatsoever on the size of the military budget. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "We simply cannot reduce defense spending" without undermining the "security" interests of the United States. A refusal to cut requests--even by a single dollar!--was also his response to members of the budget committees who asked him which particular expenditure items he would be prepared to cut if his request should be denied. According to reports in the American press, in the middle of February the White House, disturbed by the congressional opposition and the mounting public dissatisfaction with the increase in military spending (attested to by public opinion polls), decided to launch a broad media campaign in defense of its budget proposals.

Disagreements over the size of military appropriations were just a part of the extensive congressional debates on the budget as a whole. The huge projected budget deficit and the further cuts in social programs combined with increased military spending aroused dissatisfaction in the Capitol. During the previous 2 years the Democrats had suffered substantial political injuries from their failure to suggest any kind of viable alternative to Ronald Reagan's policy line. Last spring, the Democratic leaders in Congress tried to strengthen their party's position on the threshold of the 1984 election by presenting a program the Democrats were prepared to promote. Within a few days, on 15 March, the Democrats followed up this initiative by proposing an alternative draft budget for fiscal year 1984. It envisaged an increase of only 4 percent, excluding adjustments for inflation, in military spending.

Events then developed with dramatic speed. Two days later the House Budget Committee set a military expenditure "ceiling" at the level envisaged in the alternative budget, reducing the President's requested rate of increase by more than half. Reagan issued a special statement to the press in which he spoke of the need to "restore America's defensive capabilities" and accused the Democrats of "undermining these efforts" by proposing their own budget. On 23 March, however, the House of Representatives passed the budget resolution reflecting the principles of the alternative draft, including its military expenditure guidelines.

After suffering a defeat in the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, the administration naturally had high hopes for the discussion of this matter in the Senate, where Republicans are in the majority. But Chairman Domenici of the Senate Budget Committee informed the White House that his committee would also be unlikely to support the requested increase in military spending. Then the President attempted to postpone the Senate discussion of the budget resolution until the beginning of April. He hinted that he might make "some concessions" with regard to the size of the military budget.

After winning this respite, the administration decided to use it for a completely different purpose than weighing military expenditure reduction possibilities. On the contrary, everything possible was done during these few weeks to win public support for the administration's request. The President addressed the nation on television and traveled from state to state to make appeals for public support for the buildup of American military strength. It was during these days that he "distinguished himself" by loudly calling the socialist world the "evil empire." In another speech, he promised to save the Americans from nuclear retaliation by deploying an ABM system in space, an idea taken straight from science fiction.

As TIME magazine remarked, however, "the President's crusade had the opposite effect on the public."² The sharp increase in military spending began to be opposed not only by liberals and moderates, but even by some conservative members of both parties.

On 5 April the President met with all 12 Republican members of the Senate Budget Committee. The meeting was also attended by members of the cabinet and Reagan's advisers. The senators clearly warned the President that the committee would not approve his proposed 10-percent increase; some tried to reach a compromise by suggesting that the increase be limited to 7 percent, but Reagan would not give in. The senators learned the value of his previous promises of compromise: He declared his willingness to compromise only on a few meaningless amendments to his proposals. After the meeting, even Senator J. Tower from Texas, a well-known "hawk," said that the President's proposed military budget was "doomed."

On 7 April, when discussions began in the Budget Committee, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger announced that he might agree to an increase of 7.9 percent in military spending. Less than 5 minutes before the end of the voting, Reagan called Domenici on the phone and asked him to postpone the matter again until after "a new round of talks," but the senator refused. At the insistence

of the Democratic senators, the first vote concerned Reagan's proposed 10-percent increase in military spending. The committee members, Republicans and Democrats, rejected the proposal by a vote of 19 to 2. A proposed 5-percent increase was then passed by a vote of 17 to 4. American press and television reporters unanimously interpreted the outcome of the vote in the Senate Budget Committee as Reagan's most serious failure in budget matters since the beginning of his administration, particularly in view of the preceding House decision. The White House published a statement that the President was "deeply disappointed in the outcome of the vote."

The administration made some covert attempts to correct the situation and to minimize military budget cuts. The Republican majority leader in the Senate, H. Baker, was privately requested to ask Budget Committee members to consider raising the expenditure increase to around 7 percent. These consultations were apparently unproductive, and when the full Senate began to discuss the budget resolution in the first half of May, Baker and Domenici proposed a plan, approved by the President in advance, envisaging an increase of 7.5 percent in the military budget along with other proposals. This was another failure for Reagan and the Senate Republican leadership. The plan was rejected by a vote of 52 to 48.

The budget resolutions of both houses were then passed on to a conference committee, where the texts of the two were combined. At the end of June the final draft of the joint resolution was approved by both houses.³ The increase in military spending was limited to 5 percent, half of the figure proposed by the President.

The development of the new MX intercontinental strategic missile was the central topic of discussion on Capitol Hill from the very first months of the 98th Congress. At the end of the last session of Congress, in December 1982, the allocation of 625 million dollars for the development and testing of this missile was postponed until such time as the President could submit new basing proposals to the Congress. This decision was the result of a strong congressional tradition of not disputing the expediency of strategic weapon systems as such, but using the argument of technical flaws to oppose a specific program. This is what happened with the MX: Although the majority of those who voted against appropriations for the missile were against the production of the MX in general, the request was denied on the grounds of the unacceptability of the President's proposed basing method. "It is quite easy to vote against an absurd basing method," Senator P. Tsongas (Democrat, Massachusetts) said. "It is much more difficult to vote against the whole system."⁴

In January the President established a commission on strategic forces, headed by B. Scowcroft, President Ford's national security adviser. The committee members were Republicans and Democrats, but a clear majority were "hawks" and there were no members representing the opponents of Ronald Reagan's military programs. The administration hoped to use this bipartisan body to conduct covert bargaining and to reach a compromise that might drive a wedge between a strong group of moderate Republicans and Democrats and the rest of the MX missile's opponents.

When the report of the Scowcroft Commission⁵ was published on 11 April, it was clear that the administration had succeeded. In brief, the commission's recommendations stated that 100 MX missiles should be produced and located in Minuteman silos, that the development of Trident-II missiles should be continued and that a new generation of mobile Midgetman missiles should be developed. The report also contained an appeal for a nuclear arms control agreement with the USSR, although the wording of the appeal was quite vague. A large group of congressmen, several dozen of the MX missile's former opponents, expressed their willingness to support the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations. The report was the target of harsh criticism by the missile's more consistent opponents. Senator M. Hatfield (Republican, Oregon) said that "all of this can only be described as madness. If the commission's recommendations are approved, we will have every reason to announce that the United States has armed itself with a first-strike strategy."

The moderate congressmen who supported the commission's recommendations believed that since these recommendations constituted a single entity, their adoption would indicate a definite victory: The Congress would approve the production of the MX, but the President would also be obligated to act on the proposal regarding nuclear arms talks. At the beginning of May Ronald Reagan received two letters from senators and members of the House of Representatives. Senators C. Percy (Republican, Illinois), S. Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) and W. Cohen (Republican, Maine) wrote a letter to warn the President that they would not vote for the MX if the administration did not take a more flexible stand on arms control, and asked the administration to change its approach to START. Reagan received a similar letter from 10 members of the House of Representatives, headed by A. Gore (Democrat, Tennessee).

The White House did not miss any opportunities. The President personally lobbied congressmen, giving them every assurance that he also favored arms control. An official statement was issued to report the President's total support for all of the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations. Reagan sent letters to nine members of the House and many senators, promising to display "flexibility" in START. He met several times with many undecided senators to convince them of his belief in the cause of disarmament. All of these assurances were only of the most general nature: The President carefully avoided making any clear commitments. The President made a more "definite" remark on only one specific congressional initiative--the proposal of Senators Nunn and Cohen, in accordance with which each side would reduce existing missiles by two for each new missile deployed. He called this initiative "useful." The NEW YORK TIMES reported, however, that if Reagan agreed completely with this proposal, his deployment of 100 MX missiles with 10 warheads each would call for the withdrawal of 2,000 of the 2,100 existing nuclear warheads on Minuteman missiles, which he obviously had no intention of doing. "So who is fooling whom?" the newspaper asked in an ironic tone.

In the same editorial the newspaper warned that "Congress will be agreeing to a dangerous venture if it releases funds for the MX in exchange for President Ronald Reagan's vague promises of some kind of new policy in the area of arms control and arms development."⁶ Other warnings were also issued. Senator D. Bumpers (Democrat, Arkansas) argued with the defenders of White House policy who alleged that Congress would be able to influence the administration's

position in START: "If the administration takes a hostile approach to arms control, nothing will make it strive for this control." He also stressed that votes in the Congress could not result in the approval of all of the proposals in the Scowcroft Commission report, because this would essentially settle only one specific matter--the matter of whether the funds for the MX would be released or not.

But the White House's lobbying campaign did not stop, and it began to produce results. In the first half of May the appropriations committees of both houses advised the release of the funds. Reagan met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress and with a group of influential congressmen, and on the day of the vote in the House he even published an article in the WASHINGTON POST under the hypocritical headline "The MX: The Key to Arms Reduction," in which he asked the Congress to support his demands. On 24 May the House of Representatives voted to allow the Pentagon to spend the withheld MX funds (239 for, 186 against). The Senate passed a similar resolution the next day.

Reagan had won a double "victory": On the one hand, he won congressional approval of the MX and, on the other, he drowned out the negative talk about the militarist president with torrents of pseudopeaceful demagogy. This happened only because a large group of moderate congressmen from both parties agreed to swallow the pill represented by the Scowcroft Commission recommendations with some degree of trust in the President's promises of progress in START.

The administration was able to maintain this coalition in subsequent months, when authorizing legislation for fiscal year 1984 was being discussed in the Congress. The attempts of the opponents of the MX, headed by Senator G. Hart (Democrat, Colorado), to exclude appropriations for this missile from this legislation were unsuccessful. On 26 July the Senate approved the allocation of funds for the production and deployment of 27 MX missiles by a vote of 58 to 41. A few days earlier the House had also consented to the production of 21 missiles. The work of a conference committee resulted in a decision to allocate funds for the production of 21 missiles, and this decision was approved by both houses in September at the height of the chauvinistic campaign connected with the South Korean airliner incident provoked by Washington.

When the MX was discussed during the subsequent debates on military authorizations, the alignment of forces in the Congress underwent only slight changes. When the House approved the MX allocations on 1 November, this decision was passed a majority of 9 votes, while the difference in July consisted of 13 votes. One of the leaders of the moderate group supporting the President, Congressman A. Gore, called the situation in the House a "precarious balance," but nevertheless insisted that "the President has fulfilled his part of this unprecedented agreement. We must fulfill ours."⁷ It would be difficult to say what Gore interpreted as the President's fulfillment of these commitments: After all, as long as the talks were still going on in Geneva, the American side made no serious moves to actually reach an agreement. England's ECONOMIST magazine stated that Reagan had to "pay" for each congressional concession.⁸ In fact, however, this payment was made in counterfeit money.

Another topic of heated arguments during the discussion of the military budget in the Congress was the administration's proposal regarding the assembly-line production of binary paralytic nerve gases and the corresponding munitions--"Big Eye" bombs and 155-mm shells. In its draft budget, the administration requested 157.8 million dollars for this purpose for fiscal year 1984, but during the next 10 years as a whole the Pentagon plans to spend 10 billion in this field.

Opposition to the planned production of binary munitions was already apparent at the end of March 1983. A group of congressmen held a press conference to announce their intention to introduce an amendment prohibiting the production of these weapons. Congressman L. AuCoin (Democrat, Oregon), one of the authors of the amendment, said: "It is necessary to realize that the chemical arms race could rebound. There is no moral justification for these abominable weapons. It is not surprising that the West European allies have reacted with horror to the President's plans." Another author of the amendment, Congressman W. Green (Republican, New York), advised the conclusion of a chemical arms control treaty with the Soviet Union.

A similar legislative initiative was put forth in the Senate at the beginning of April by M. Hatfield, G. Hart, T. Cochran (Republican, Mississippi) and D. Pryor (Democrat, Arkansas).

Just as in previous years, the opponents of chemical arms production won considerable support in both houses of Congress. In June, when authorizing legislation was being discussed in the House of Representatives, the proposal on the production of binary gases was rejected by a margin of 14 votes. The decision to refuse the administration's request for funds for the production of the corresponding artillery shells was passed by an even greater margin (95 votes). The situation was different in the Senate. When an amendment refusing the request for funds was introduced there in July, the vote was a tie (49:49) and a decision was made in the administration's favor after Vice-President G. Bush cast a vote in the capacity of Senate chairman (one of the constitutional prerogatives of the vice president).

Nevertheless, the supporters of the binary gases were able to influence the conference committee that discussed the House and Senate bills at the beginning of August. Most of the congressmen who worked on the committee were members of the House Armed Services Committee, who usually support all Pentagon requests. They did not create any problems for the senators who supported allocations for chemical weapons. When the bill on authorizations was discussed in the House in the middle of September, the atmosphere in the country was so charged by the White House's belligerent demagoguery that the opponents of the chemical weapons in the Congress preferred to avoid clashes and authorized the allocations for binary gas production. One of the authors of the amendment in the Senate, D. Pryor, said that he preferred not to fight "at this extremely emotional time" and would wait "until our prospects look somewhat better."

The battle was resumed during the discussion of the defense authorizations bill. At the beginning of October the American press reported that a "Big Eye" binary gas bomb had set itself off in testing and that the Pentagon had

concealed this fact during the discussion of chemical weapons in the Congress. These reports came from Congressman E. Bethune (Republican, Arkansas), whose electoral district is in direct proximity to the Pine Bluff complex where the binary gases are to be produced.

During the vote on the defense appropriations bill in the House of Representatives, the congressmen again approved the amendment excluding funds for chemical arms production. At the end of October a similar decision was made by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The vote in the Senate, however, was another tie, and the vice president decided the issue again by voting for the production of the nerve gas.

This time, however, the conference committee, which completed its work just before the end of the session, supported the House position, and appropriations for binary gas production were excluded from the final draft of the bill. It was in this form that it was passed by both houses on the last day of the session. The Reagan Administration has requested appropriations for chemical arms production from the Congress three times, in 1981, 1982 and 1983, but these requests have always been denied on Capitol Hill.

The opponents of Reagan's program were unable to win any significant victories in their efforts to block the other strategic arms programs included in the bill on appropriations for fiscal year 1984. Congressman J. Addabbo did not succeed in cutting allocations for the B-1 bomber or in limiting them to a single year. The Congress agreed to finance this program, with an estimated cost of 20 billion dollars, until all 100 of the projected planes have been built. Amendments envisaging the limitation of purchases of Pershing-II missiles for Pentagon needs were rejected. In defense of the administration's position, House Republican leader R. Michel (Illinois) insisted that these missiles are necessary "trump cards" in negotiations with the Soviet side: "We cannot continue negotiating with the Soviet Union if we curtail purchases of the Pershing-II." However illusory and futile this position might be, it was supported by the majority of congressmen.

The final draft of the bill on defense authorizations includes funds for all of the basic programs of strategic and other weapons requested by the Reagan Administration, with the exception of chemical weapons. Billions of dollars have been allocated for the MX, Pershing-II and Trident-II missiles, the B-1 bomber, the Trident nuclear submarine and other new strategic weapon systems which, in the White House's opinion, should make the United States superior to the Soviet Union on the strategic level.

Total military spending in fiscal year 1984 has been projected at around 250 billion dollars (excluding the military programs of other agencies). Excluding adjustments for inflation, this figure is 17 billion dollars, or 7.3 percent, higher than the figure for the last fiscal year and twice as high as the figure 4 years ago. If inflation is taken into account, however, total military appropriations will not exceed the 5-percent ceiling set by the budget resolution. In any case, these appropriations have set a "record" and are unprecedented in U.S. history.

Some Americans have noted that Congress has now cut administration military requests for the second year in a row. But besides the fact that these cuts will not affect the main military programs and that they represent only a negligible amount in comparison to the growing military budgets, the administration seems to have found a way to compensate for even these small cuts. According to reports in the American press, when Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger met with Senate Republican leaders in December, he said he would ask the President to increase military requests for fiscal year 1985 by 17 percent, including inflation adjustments, or by 55 billion dollars, which should compensate for the cuts made in 1984.⁹ In fact, this is what happened. The fiscal year 1985 draft budget submitted by the administration on 1 February 1984 envisaged 305 billion dollars in appropriations for the Pentagon--a total of 313.4 billion if appropriations for the military programs of other agencies are included--a figure 19 percent greater than the figure for the current fiscal year. If this should continue, even if the Congress cuts the administration's requested rate of increase in half in each military budget, it will still cover all previous cuts.

FOOTNOTES

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2 February 1983.
2. TIME, 18 April 1983, p 11.
3. Budget resolutions are acts of Congress which set general budget parameters for the coming fiscal year; they do not have to be signed by the President. The authorizing legislation drafted by the Congress for specific programs and bills on appropriations cannot envisage expenditures exceeding the limits set in budget resolutions.
4. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 14 April 1983.
5. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 10, pp 119-124.
6. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 17 May 1983.
7. Ibid., 2 November 1983.
8. ECONOMIST, 28 November 1983, p 45.
9. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 9 December 1983.

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AMERICAN 'CRITICAL' SOCIOLOGY ON U.S. RULING CIRCLES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 22 Mar 84) pp 81-89

[Article by V. M. Zubok]

[Text] The question of "who rules America" has become one of the most burning issues in the United States. The authors of many studies published in the United States have attempted to analyze, and sometimes quite critically, the political, social and economic ties of members of ruling circles. As a rule, these works contain many biographical facts about former presidents, secretaries and members of unofficial "shadow" cabinets. Sociological works occupy a prominent place in this literature: They contain detailed information about the personal bonds linking government circles with monopoly capital and about the machinery for the recruitment of statesmen in the economically privileged circles of society. The information collected in these works indicates how far the process of the concentration of power has gone in the nation.

The works of the majority of American sociologists, including those of the radical-critical school, have been analyzed in detail in studies by Soviet philosophers, historians and sociologists. For example, Soviet historians have examined the views of the "radical" school on the workers and socialist movement, bourgeois revolutions and various aspects of U.S. domestic and foreign policy.¹ The research findings of Soviet scientists have served as the basis for a critical approach to the most widely used generalizations and terms in contemporary American sociology and non-Marxist journalistic works about U.S. ruling circles.

The traditions of the critical interpretation of the institution of power in the United States were established by American historians of the "economic" (or "progressivist") school, such as C. Beard, V. Parrington and others. For them, the very purpose of historical progress consisted in the political democratization of society--in limiting the privileges of the ruling elite. The progressivist approach to the study of ruling circles, according to V. V. Sogrin, was based largely on the requests and demands of radical and reformist antimonopoly movements of the imperialist era.²

Qualitatively new developments connected with the concentration of economic and political power in the nation in the 1930's and 1940's in connection with

the beginning of the United States' state-monopoly stage of development served as an objectively important prerequisite for the study of power. It was no coincidence that the "elitist" theories of G. Mosca and V. Pareto made their way to the United States from Europe at precisely that time, finding a new home there.³

But the sociological study of ruling circles did not become a field of science in the 1940's or the 1950's. Under the influence of the social-reformist illusions engendered by F. D. Roosevelt's policy, the social sciences became more conservative and conformist than before. The critical traditions of "progressivism" were submerged under a flood of praise for the "welfare state" and for those who headed it. At that time American sociology was experiencing the dramatic modification of research techniques and did not take on any broad subjects. Few sociological studies of ruling circles transcended the narrow bounds of empiricism and sets of statistics.⁴

It became "unpatriotic," and later, during the McCarthy era, simply dangerous, to question the "democratic" nature of the state and the "unselfishness" and "wisdom" of ruling circles.

Nevertheless, even then some works were written in the traditions of the "progressivist school," such as the works of E. Baltzell.⁵ This sociologist used his study of the social elite in Philadelphia to shed light on the role of the oldest segment of the U.S. ruling class, the northeastern bourgeois aristocracy, in the nation's sociopolitical affairs. He states that members of the upper echelon of government, particularly in the sphere of foreign policy, came from this milieu, which he calls the "Protestant establishment" (it consisted mainly of the descendants of Anglo-Saxon Protestant settlers), until the 1930's. The corporate spirit and a sense of the exclusivity of this milieu were reinforced by education in a few private "ivy-league" colleges. Baltzell believes (fully in the spirit of "progressivism") that it was this corporate spirit, which even had elements of a caste system, that aided in relegating the "Protestant establishment" to the periphery of government and politics by the 1960's.

The revival of "critical" interest in U.S. ruling circles is generally associated with the publication of C. W. Mills' work "The Power Elite" in 1956 and with the journalistic activity of this sociologist. Under the influence of Mills, the machinery of power began to be debated by American sociologists: He questioned the concept of "pluralist democracy" that had taken shape by the mid-1950's, a concept in which government was viewed as an objective arbiter for competing "interest groups," primarily business and the labor unions. C. W. Mills, whose theories were subjected to thorough Marxist criticism long ago, was not only a sociologist. He was a petty bourgeois Democrat whose political views were influenced by the traditions of southern populism on the one hand and by the social-reformist ideology of the 1930's and 1940's on the other. He made scathing remarks about the empirical sociologists who tried to avoid the critical analysis of the political realities surrounding them. For him the very theme of the "power elite" was an ideological weapon, aimed against the bureaucratization of public administration and the concentration of power in an authoritarian hierarchy.⁶

Mills' work laid the basis for the renewal of criticism in American sociology. The "New Left" of the first half of the 1960's and all of the "radical sociology" of the second half of that decade developed under his strong influence. Mills also pointed out a new promising field of research--the "window" to which critical thinkers rushed: the study of the institutions of power. The main thing, he wrote, "is not the actual group of people at the top at any given time," but the concentration and centralization of administrative functions in certain institutions, which themselves choose and mold those who climb to the top.⁷

For totally understandable reasons, the researchers of these institutions initially suffered from "informational hunger" and had to turn to the most odious sources--even to rightist Bircher publications.⁸

The institutional approach to the sociological study of ruling circles found practical application in the works of the "Domhoff school," connected with groups of the "New Left." In contrast to C. W. Mills, who argued with Marxists, the researchers of this school acknowledged the class division of society, but interpreted the composition of these classes in their own way. W. Domhoff, a sociologist from the University of California, defined ruling circles as the politically active nucleus of the so-called "upper class." This nucleus, according to his view of the power structure, makes the "upper class" the ruling class in society through a system of institutions and relations with government and political establishments. When Domhoff spoke of the "upper class," he was referring to the particular segments of the grand bourgeoisie that were closely connected to the levers of economic power and had organizational advantages and administrative experience. They, in his opinion, automatically become the heads of government and political-party administrative structures. This vulgarized approach to the machinery of power was criticized by Marxist authors long ago. Domhoff believed that the executive branch of the federal government was the key institution of "upper class" rule. Candidates for government office, according to him, are chosen by informal "upper class" organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations. This group of organizations consequently sets the guidelines for the sociological study of ruling circles, and W. Domhoff originally took his information about this group and its makeup from rightwing journalists D. Smoot and M. Davidson.⁹

Domhoff headed the school of sociologists who studied the U.S. "power structure" and once rallied round the journal INSURGENT SOCIOLOGIST. The most painstaking studies were conducted with the aid of the institutional method. These authors were concerned with the exact elements of the "upper class" (later this term was replaced by the term "ruling class" in their works) making up ruling circles, and they also studied the various institutions connecting monopoly circles with government policy. The most successful of these works was the book by L. Shoup and W. Minter on the origins of the New York Council on Foreign Relations and its activity from the 1940's to the beginning of the 1970's.¹⁰

In the second half of the 1960's the study of the nature of U.S. ruling circles underwent an abrupt change. The ideas of C. W. Mills and the "New Left" became quite popular among the activists of mass protest movements,

particularly students and the liberal intelligentsia. At this time there were broad demonstrations in the United States and other developed capitalist countries in the West against the entire system of state-monopoly capitalism, and the first conflict between state-monopoly capitalism and the new, "educated" segments of the working class came into being.¹¹ In the United States the general democratic antiwar movement and other social movements of this period did not transcend the bounds of petty bourgeois radicalism in their ideological development, but the attention of their ideologists, particularly leftist radicals, was correctly focused on new signs of the concentration of power in the superstructure of public administration. The criticism of these signs, however, was wholly emotional and fit utopian-romantic patterns. The key term of this period was "establishment."

This word entered American political terminology when talented journalist R. Rovere used it as the title of his political pamphlet in 1961. It was then that J. Kennedy was putting together a team of experts in public administration, recruiting people from the board of the Rockefeller Foundation and other monopoly-capitalist organizations. Rovere included John McCloy, Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk and some others in the "American establishment." The term itself was borrowed from the political terminology of Great Britain, where it signified a specific segment of the ruling class with a tradition of specializing in public administration, as a result of which a developed bureaucratic service did not come into being in this country until the 20th century. By seizing the most important political positions, members of the establishment were able to control public life independently, without any mediation by top-level bureaucrats.¹²

In the United States this term became a permanent part of the political slogans of the antiwar and youth movements, the members of which demanded the democratization of public administration or "participatory democracy." Liberal sociologists, public spokesmen and ideologists were divided: Some supported the demands for democratization, while others insisted on the continuous growth of the role and authority of the "elite" of experts in political administration.¹³

At that time the activities of the foreign policy establishment--or, in other words, the top circle of the executive branch during the cold war era--were exposed by journalists at the height of the antiwar movement. The historical origins and social psychology of this elite were criticized by R. Barnet, D. Halberstam, J. Donovan and other authors. Their thoughts were summarized by liberal English journalist G. Hodgson, known for his association with the "New Left." Hodgson wrote that World War II "had united the three groups making up the contemporary American foreign policy establishment: the internationalist attorneys, bankers and executives of transnational corporations in New York, government officials in Washington and academic experts."¹⁴ In essence, this thesis was confirmed by the research of Soviet historian N. V. Sivachev, who wrote that the war years "gave flesh and blood" to the state-monopoly organism in the United States and unified a new galaxy of "American bourgeois ideologists and politicians who began the institutionalization of state-monopoly capitalism."¹⁵

Hodgson noted that the establishment took its final form at the height of the cold war. At that time its members had the following characteristics: They

did not seek elective offices and tried to bypass the Congress and avoid publicity by attaining their goals through informal contacts, backed up by the strength of the presidency. Finally, they were distinguished by an unconditional belief in the dogmas of foreign and military policy.¹⁶

The term "elite" took on new political-ideological meaning at that time. The growing criticism of the old conformist myth about "pluralist democracy" gave rise to "neo-elitism," with T. Dye as its most prominent representative.¹⁷

At the beginning of his career in political science, Dye supported the idea of "democratic pluralism." By the end of the 1960's he concentrated on the investigation of the power structure. In the preface to the book he wrote with L. Zeigler, he proceeded from the assumption that the "interest groups" which were viewed as "representatives" of the masses in conformist theories are more like a "platform from which a relatively homogeneous group, the elite, governs the nation."¹⁸ In the 1970's T. Dye paid increasing attention to the informal organizations of the elite: the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution, the Committee for Economic Development and the Trilateral Commission. In 1978 they were the central institutions in his "oligarchic model" of American politics.¹⁹

In spite of the formal similarity of T. Dye's theories to C. W. Mills' ideas, their ideological aims were not the same: Neo-elitism reflected the contradictory position of the liberal bourgeoisie during the period of the mass democratic movements and its fear of the masses, as well as the disillusionment of members of the broad democratic movement who had failed in their attempt to storm the social foundations of power and no longer believed in the possibility of establishing a democracy without an elite. It is no coincidence that government officials play the role of pawns or intermediaries in Dye's oligarchic system, and conflicts between them, between the President and the Congress and between liberals and conservatives, can only postpone the implementation of policy made in the informal elite organizations mentioned above. Dye absolutely ignored the possible influence of the masses and progressive forces on public administration.

In the first half of the 1970's the Republican administration, and R. Nixon in particular, became the target of liberal-reformist and leftist-radical journalists. Later the 1976 campaign was marked by pointed "anti-establishment" attacks: In particular, the prospect of the return of a Democratic administration led to criticism of the group of individuals who had inherited the title of public administration "experts" in the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's. The authors of articles in the NEW REPUBLIC, HARPERS and the WASHINGTON MONTHLY were particularly critical of this group. The last of these, which was founded in 1969 by former government official C. Peters, united the talented young people from the antiwar movement who had chosen a career in journalism. In their view, the advisers surrounding J. Carter even during the primary elections personified the "old establishment." In an article entitled "The Foreign Policy Club: They Were Wrong Before and They Are Wrong Again," R. Morris, a former NSC staffer under H. Kissinger, wrote: "All but a few of the 23 members of Carter's foreign and military policy research group belong to the same little inbred world comprised of the Brookings Institution, FOREIGN AFFAIRS and

FOREIGN POLICY magazines and certain charitable foundations and investment and law firms. This is the melting pot of a hundred people...who look like one another, read one another's articles,...promote one another and, finally, occupy positions where they can be called upon by Jimmy Carter."²⁰

Another journalist, T. Bethell, included 200 people in the establishment and listed the institutions backing them up: the university complex in Cambridge, the congressional foreign policy bureaucracy, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Harvard University John F. Kennedy Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations and FOREIGN POLICY magazine. He said that the periphery of the establishment was bounded on the right by the American Enterprise Institute and on the left by the Institute for Policy Studies (both located in Washington).²¹

The protest movements in many strata of society in the 1960's and the arousal of these strata to take social action strengthened the "radical current" in American sociology. This led to the birth of what Soviet philosopher I. S. Kon called "thematic radicalism." The radical sociologists correctly directed attention to the sociopolitical power structure in the United States, which they called the "machinery of class hegemony," borrowing a term coined by A. Gramsci. The term "corporate liberalism," taken from "radical" historians (G. Kolko and others), was used even more widely.²²

As Soviet researchers have pointed out, the contribution of radical sociologists was contradictory and even incomplete on the level of theory and methodology in the 1970's. For example, after the Watergate political crisis, several authors (C. Oglesby, K. Sale and T. Dye) suggested the existence of a struggle within the "ruling class," between the old guard based in the northeast and the young, rapidly growing segment backed up by the economic development of the south and southwest. This thesis, however, did not receive any conclusive reinforcement in later American sociological studies. A book edited by W. Domhoff, "Power Structure Research," was published in 1980 and did not add anything new to the earlier approach: Studies based on statistics were confined to the empirical clarification of the same object--the undifferentiated "ruling class." But the events of the 1970's and 1980's did not fit into the framework of "corporate liberalism" or the "oligarchic model" of politics. Now that earlier methods of public administration were proving ineffective, the struggle between different segments of the bourgeoisie in ruling circles became increasingly apparent, and a rightward shift was acquiring distinct outlines.

Up to this point, we have been discussing journalistic and sociological works connected in some way with progressive democratic currents, protests against the policy of ruling circles and their exposure in the spirit of the "muck-rakers" of the early 20th century. But the theme of the ruling elite took on other pertinent political forms. Inveterate reactionaries made active use of establishment slogans to draw the accumulating "democratic anti-statist" potential in the country over to the right. On the level of national policy, this "rightwing populist" tactic was already being used for demagogic purposes by R. Nixon and J. McCarthy at the end of the 1940's. At the end of the 1960's this line was taken up by R. Reagan and, in particularly crude forms, by

G. Wallace. In 1969 rightwing journalist K. Phillips attacked the "liberal establishment," referring to the political-administration community that had taken shape between the 1930's and 1960's, in his book "The Emerging Republican Majority" and tried to represent the interests of the "silent majority" of Americans.²³ As we know, Phillips' ideas were not unnoticed by R. Nixon and influenced his behavior in the presidency.

Neoconservatives also added their bit to the criticism of the "liberal establishment."²⁴ They could not forgive the liberal elite for the alliance formed with political activists in the late 1960's and early 1970's on the wave of the antiwar, women's, civil rights and other movements. Most of the neoconservatives were united by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) and COMMENTARY magazine. The latter printed an article called "The Rise and Fall of the New Foreign Policy Establishment."²⁵ The author, prominent journalist K. Gershman from the Social Democrats of the United States, began by stressing the connections between Carter's foreign policy advisers and the "old internationalist establishment" which controlled American policy in the cold war era. But establishment institutions, the author said, had undergone qualitative changes: Their reputation was undermined by the Vietnam War, they became more open, and their influence on government policy grew weaker during the years of the Nixon Administration. But the main thing was the disappearance of the general public's earlier trust in cold war doctrines, especially the doctrine of "containment." "The establishment," Gershman wrote, "could only regain its authority by offering a new religion--by giving American foreign policy new directions in the post-Vietnam era with a view to the failure in Vietnam." The people on the staff of FOREIGN POLICY magazine, he believes, tried to establish this kind of religion: These ranged from representatives of the "old elite," such as P. Warnke, to radical intellectuals like R. Barnett from the Institute for Policy Studies. The nucleus of the engineers of the "new" foreign policy, as yet only on paper, consisted of foreign policy experts of the "Vietnam generation"--L. Gelb, R. Holbrooke, A. Lake and others--and the "unclassifiable" Z. Brzezinski, S. Hoffman and R. Allman. M. and W. Bundy, C. Clifford and C. Vance entered the "new establishment" as figureheads of continuity and experience.

Interpreting the dissatisfaction with the Carter Administration in the late 1970's and early 1980's as a vote of no confidence in the foreign policy strategy of the "new establishment," the author hastened to declare that "hawks" from the CPD should replace the discredited "liberals" and "pacifists." It is interesting that these words were followed by action. In 1980 a group of neoconservatives joined the Reagan coalition.

Another group of journalists employed similar terminology, but this time for the purpose of rationalizing the actions of traditional ruling class experts and guarding them against criticism from the right. In 1976 NEW YORK TIMES correspondent L. Gelb, former adviser on military policy in the Johnson Administration, declared²⁶ that "the new establishment" was "not a club of like-minded people, not a conspiratorial center, not a ruling committee, but more of a professional aristocracy." The nucleus of this aristocracy, he explained, consisted of up to 300 attorneys, businessmen, congressional aides and advisers, executives of charitable foundations, experts from "think tanks"

and even journalists. The author suggested that the technocratic elite had absorbed and actually replaced the "old and familiar establishment of Wall Street bankers and lawyers."

The crisis of bourgeois-reformist methods of government was also reflected in bourgeois academic science: in sociology and political science. The question "Who rules America," which was first raised in the second half of the 1960's, changed a decade later to "Why is it so hard to rule America?" On the whole, authors have been inclined to blame the masses and the "interest groups" representing broad strata. They often said that the problem could be solved by moving democratic groups further away from spheres of influence on government affairs and by creating a staff of qualified public and political administrators. For example, K. Prewitt and W. McAllister conducted a statistical analysis of the top government officials from the 1930's through the 1960's²⁷ and concluded that the beginning of the 1960's represented a watershed in the establishment of the "new administrative elite," which they feel meets the requirements of "nationalized politics" and the "new government structures and obligations" that came into being at the time of the "New Deal" and during World War II. The lawyers who scurried back and forth between government establishments and corporate law firms in New York are now more frequently succeeded (but certainly not replaced completely) by academic specialists or expert "technocrats."

N. Polsby, a disciple and follower of R. Dahl (C. W. Mills' chief opponent in the early 1960's), directs attention to the increasing role of the "big press," which, according to this sociologist, became the key element of the new system of political mediation, on the basis of which a stratum of professional party manipulators took shape. He calls "consumer advocates," women's organizations and ecologists "media creations." In the absence of the previous stable mediating structures, the President now owes political debts to these groups.²⁸

H. Hecla writes about the rapid politicization of ruling circles and administration "appointees." Various amorphous groups and a politically fragmented Congress try to influence the appointment process. He and political scientist G. Mackenzie view the centralization of the appointment process within the White House as a natural cure for the fragmentation of governmental power.²⁹

Finally, crises and the transitional nature of the situation were reflected in the information collected by prominent WASHINGTON POST journalist D. Broder about the new generation of U.S. politicians, including the young members of Democratic ruling circles.³⁰ Many of them, if not the majority, were influenced, as the author proves, by the social protest movements of the 1960's and early 1970's and by the general democratic movement. This is the reason for their strictly antibureaucratic frame of mind. The author intuitively realizes that this antibureaucratism stems from objective causes, the main one being the inability of the central authority to solve social problems by using earlier reformist methods. This inability fostered faith in the rightwing politicians of a new coalition, the "New Right," located on the periphery of public administration up to that time. Their political recipes acquired new meaning under the conditions of the crisis of the "liberal wisdom" of earlier ruling circles.

In the second half of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's works on ruling circles became a source of political and ideological jargon, and the terms they contained became a permanent part of the terminology of various conflicting political groups, both those on the offensive and those on the defensive, both neoconservative and liberal-reformist. This tendency to constantly verge on "academic validity" and current political issues complicates the assimilation of information and saturates it with ideological implications.

This is also true of the information presented in leftist liberal and leftist radical journalism and that collected by the progressive American sociologists who, in D. M. Gvishiani's words, "are no longer inclined to defend the philosophical premises of bourgeois society, but frequently oppose them directly."³¹

The election of J. Carter and his connection with the Trilateral Commission immediately aroused the interest of these circles. T. Hayden, one of the authors of the Port Huron Declaration, a policy-planning document of the "New Left" in the beginning of the 1960's, called the commission the "latest coordinating machinery of the elite," which had seized the top posts in government, particularly in the foreign policy sphere.³² His interest was also aroused by the new group of politicians including A. Young, S. Brown and other leaders of democratic movements engendered by the social upheavals of the 1960's. Hayden suggested that these people might "represent the next generation of foreign policymakers in a decade."

Leftist sociologists A. Wolfe and S. Bowles defined the Carter Administration as a response to the crisis of "corporate liberalism" and said that it had a contradictory aim: to preserve the existing system of political alliances while curbing the increasing activity of "lower strata" and reversing the process of political democratization.³³

At the beginning of the 1980's sociologist and historian L. Shoup tried to employ the theories of the "Domhoff school" in an analysis of the political situation. He believed that the "ruling class" of the Carter presidency resorted to new forms of political control: It proposed "symbolic populism" in place of reformist policy as a means of mobilizing the masses. On the eve of the 1980 election it became obvious that Carter had ceased to be a suitable figurehead for this kind of mobilization. As a result of his presidency, Shoup writes, the "New Deal" coalition and the old alliance between "corporate liberalism" and labor leaders were undermined, if not destroyed. He concluded that old alliances would continue to collapse and the American masses would grow increasingly disillusioned with the system.³⁴

The strength of old ideas was reflected in the attempts of American leftist radical sociologists to assess the causes and consequences of Ronald Reagan's election victory. In a collective study³⁵ by prominent political scientists and journalists of "critical" and "radical" leanings, various aspects of the sociopolitical situation are examined, but the analysis is essentially conducted in the terms of either "corporate liberalism" or electoral shifts. The authors direct attention to the rightward shift of American corporate executives and to their financing of ideological and political attacks on liberal

and progressive forces. They write pessimistically about the "prolonged demobilization of the electorate" and speak of the "decline of the union movement" as a result of the integration of labor leaders into "ruling class" organizations. In this way, they present a onesided picture of the situation that took shape after the lengthy period of political democratization and dramatic mass activity. They ignore the new and covert democratic movements that might suddenly take on political features (for example, the movement for a nuclear freeze), underestimate the "rank-and-file" movement in American labor unions, etc. The traditional pessimism of the "critical" sociologists stems to some degree from feelings characteristic of the present time, but because they do not see any alternative to the technocratic trend in public administration and are disillusioned with the ability of popular, progressive forces to resist the power of monopolies which are taking the most diverse forms. They regard the "New Right" as the only dynamic force in politics today and ascribe its success to the rightward shift of the monopolistic bourgeois elite as a result of the deterioration of U.S. economic and political positions in the world at the turn of the decade.

Therefore, we could say that the "critical" sociological analysis of ruling circles became a field of science on the spearhead of sociopolitical conflicts. This new subject matter, bearing the traces of Mills' militant democratism, acquired significance as a result of widespread critical feelings about the government in the second half of the 1960's and the first half of the 1970's. In the atmosphere of the decline of democratic movements and the offensive advances of rightwing forces, this subject matter has not been forgotten, although it is being ignored by the bourgeois press, and is still being developed by "radical" sociologists. Their terms and generalizations require thorough Marxist analysis and investigation in a specific ideological and political context, because it is possible that they could play a significant ideological role in future general democratic and antimonopoly movements.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, I. S. Kon, "Radical Sociology in the United States," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1973, No 8; V. V. Sogrin, "Contemporary American Historical Works on Bourgeois Revolutions in the United States," NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, 1982, No 1; idem, "Contemporary American 'Radical' Historians on 20th-Century U.S. Domestic and Foreign Policy," ibid., 1983, No 3; idem, "Istoriografiya novoy i noveyshey istorii stran Yevropy i Ameriki" [The Historical Analysis of the Modern Contemporary History of Europe and America], Moscow, 1977.
2. V. V. Sogrin, "Ideynnye techeniya v amerikanskoy revolyutsii XVIII veka" [Ideological Currents in the American Revolution of the 18th Century], Moscow, 1980, p 31.
3. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1975, No 5, p 45.
4. I. S. Kon, Op. cit., p 29; A. M. Migranyan, "Bourgeois Ideology: The Problem of a New Paradigm," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1982, No 6, pp 36-37.

5. E. Baltzell, "Philadelphia Gentlemen. The Making of a National Upper Class," N.Y., 1958; "The Protestant Establishment. Aristocracy and Caste in America," N.Y., 1964.
6. C. W. Mills, "The Power Elite," N.Y., 1956; "C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite," compiled by W. Domhoff and Hoyte B. Ballard, Boston, 1968, pp 242, 245, 248.
7. "C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite," p 248.
8. The right wing, as Soviet researcher S. M. Plekhanov demonstrated, is distinguished by its own "concept" of history, in which the central place is assigned to an oligarchic elite "conspiracy" aimed at cultivating "collectivism" and "state-ism" in America. This is why the Right is primarily interested in the political and public institutions uniting members of the financial-monopoly oligarchy--the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the Committee for Economic Development, the business council of the Department of Commerce, the Ford, Carnegie, Rockefeller and Sloan charitable foundations, etc.
9. W. Domhoff, "Who Rules America?" Englewood Cliffs (N.J.), 1967.
10. L. Shoup and W. Minter, "Imperial Brain Trust. The Council of Foreign Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy," N.Y., 1977.
11. Yu. A. Vasil'chuk, "The Technological Revolution and the Contradictions of Developed Capitalism," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1976, No 1, p 86.
12. I. M. Bunin's afterword in the book by P. Birnbaum et al, "Frantsuzskiy pravyashchiy klass" [The French Ruling Class], Moscow, 1981, p 246.
13. V. G. Grafskiy, "Gosudarstvo i tekhnokratiya" [The State and the Technocrats], Moscow, 1981, pp 233-234; DAEDALUS, Summer 1967, pp 686-687.
14. G. Hodgson, "The Establishment," FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1973, p 8.
15. N. V. Sivachev and Ye. F. Yaz'kov, "Noveyshaya istoriya SShA" [Contemporary U.S. History], Moscow, 1980, p 142; N. V. Sivachev, "State-Monopoly Capitalism in the United States," VOPROSY ISTORII, 1977, No 7, p 85.
16. G. Hodgson, Op. cit.
17. For more detail, see G. K. Ashin, "The Elite and the Dominant Exploitative Class," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1983, No 2, pp 74-84.
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19. JOURNAL OF POLITICS, May 1978, pp 310-321.
20. WASHINGTON MONTHLY, September 1976, p 45.

21. T. Bethell, "Gentlemen-in-Waiting. The Democratic Shadow Cabinet," WASHINGTON MONTHLY, April 1976, pp 29-40.
22. I. S. Kon, Op. cit., p 45; V. V. Sogrin, "American Radical Historians on the Labor and Socialist Movement in the United States," in "Amerikanskiy yezhegodnik" [Americal Almanac], Moscow, 1982, pp 156-158; NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, 1983, No 3, pp 69-71; "Power Structure Research," edited by W. Domhoff, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1980.
23. K. Phillips, "The Emerging Republican Majority," New Rochelle, Arlington, 1969.
24. "Sovremennoye politicheskoye soznaniye v SShA" [Contemporary Political Awareness in the United States], Moscow, 1980.
25. COMMENTARY, July 1980, pp 13-16.
26. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19 December 1976.
27. K. Prewitt and W. McAllister, "Changes in the American Executive Elites 1930-1970," in "Elite Recruitment in Democratic Politics. Comparative Studies Across Nations," edited by H. Eulau and M. Czudnovski, N.Y., 1976.
28. "American Politics and Public Policy," edited by W. Burnham and M. Weinberg, Cambridge (Mass.), 1978, pp 41-54.
29. H. Heclo, "A Government of Strangers," Wash., 1977; "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in "The New American Political System," edited by A. King, Wash., 1978, pp 94-123; G. Mackenzie, "The Politics of Presidential Appointments," N.Y., 1981.
30. D. Broder, "Changing the Guard. Power and Leadership in America," N.Y., 1980.
31. VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1979, No 6, p 154.
32. ROLLING STONE, 10 March 1977, pp 36-37.
33. NATION, 18 December 1976, pp 648-652; PROGRESSIVE, June 1977, pp 20-23; A. Wolfe, "The Limits of Legitimacy. Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism," N.Y., 1977.
34. L. Shoup, "The Carter Presidency and Beyond. Politics in the 1980's," Palo Alto (Calif.), 1980, p 208.
35. "The Hidden Elections. Politics and Economics in the 1980 Presidential Campaign," edited by T. Ferguson and J. Rogers, N.Y., 1981; for a review of this book, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 5.

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BOOK ON NEW TRENDS IN ATLANTIC RIVALRY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 22 Mar 84) pp 93-95

[Review by R. G. Bogdanov of book "Atlanticheskiye soyuzniki: Novyye tendentsii v sopernichestve" [The Atlantic Allies: New Trends in Rivalry] by G. A. Vorontsov and A. I. Utkin, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1983, 237 pages]

[Text] The interrelations between the United States and Western Europe are a matter of interest to specialists. In particular, they have been analyzed more than once by G. A. Vorontsov and A. I. Utkin, who have now written a book on this subject. There is no question that this is a pertinent issue. The United States and Western Europe have been one another's main economic and military partners throughout the postwar period, linked by the factor of class solidarity and by the NATO military-political bloc.

The topic chosen by these authors is now particularly pertinent in connection with the increasing complexity of the international situation and the growing importance of security in Europe and in the entire world. Under these conditions, it is important to comprehend the contradictory nature of relations among the Atlantic allies, which are also one another's rivals. It is this aspect of Atlantic relations--the view of the United States and Western Europe as rivals--that is underscored in the title of the book and constitutes the main field of investigation. The authors point out the existence of centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in U.S. relations with Western Europe. They primarily analyze the second of these tendencies because, as they say in the foreword, they "believe that in Soviet literature the theme of 'Atlantic solidarity'...has already received considerable attention. For this reason, the authors of this book have concentrated on the analysis of new areas, points and forms of conflict, particularly in the second half of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's, when increasing activity by aggressive American imperialist circles and their allies escalated international tension and increased the danger of war" (p 6).

The book does not address itself merely to the chronologically recent period. It is of interest primarily because G. A. Vorontsov and A. I. Utkin analyze the particular new features of Atlantic rivalry that could lead to new international developments, primarily on the East-West level, in the choice of allies by the developed capitalist countries and in relations with developing states.

The book is distinguished by a comprehensive approach to the analysis of "Atlantic" relations, which consists not only in the abovementioned consideration of common and conflicting centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in U.S. relations with Western Europe, but also in an investigation of all facets and aspects of Atlantic unity and rivalry. For example, the authors thoroughly analyze the common and differing views of the United States and Western Europe on East-West ties, including their approaches to the development of trade and economic relations with the USSR and other socialist countries and on the issue of detente, revealing agreements and disagreements connected with Western Europe's own interests (pp 7-42).

The currency and financial problems of the "Atlantic world" are the subject of serious investigation. On the basis of a broad range of sources and abundant factual material, G. A. Vorontsov and A. I. Utkin demonstrate how the United States, particularly under the Reagan Administration, has seriously injured the West European economy with its egotistical policy and its refusal to consider the interests of its allies. The authors correctly interpret Western Europe's attempts to establish its own currency system as a way of defending its own economic independence, which could lead in the future to the greater autonomy of Western Europe and possibly to broader economic contacts with the USSR and other socialist countries (pp 43-65).

Relations with developing states, one source of friction within the "Atlantic camp," are analyzed in detail and in depth in the book. The United States and Western Europe are making a vigorous joint effort to retain their dominant position in the newly liberated countries. In addition, the work contains an analysis of the conflicting policies of Atlantic allies on relations with developing states (pp 66-104). The authors demonstrate how Western Europe, by virtue of its greater interest in economic ties with the developing countries, is displaying increasing willingness to adapt to new historical conditions despite Washington's pressure.

The book contains an interesting analysis of a new form of relations and conflicts that has not been investigated sufficiently in our literature--the rivalry between Atlantic partners in the arms market and their attempts to control the military business. The development of military exports has turned England and France into serious competitors for the United States. This has intensified U.S.-West European competition in some countries purchasing arms. The authors cogently demonstrate how serious a problem the saturation of the world with weapons is, and how dangerous the competition in this sphere is, now that this is stimulating the expansion of Western arms exports (pp 105-134).

The authors present a detailed analysis of relations between the Atlantic partners in matters concerning sources of raw materials, the problem of nuclear fuel and the sale of reactors (pp 135-154). The heightened competition in this area has stimulated West European moves toward cooperation and the conclusion of separate agreements with developing countries and has exacerbated conflicts between Atlantic partners. As we can see, the book contains an analysis of the entire range of U.S.-West European relations and conflicts. This analysis is based on a thorough study of documented facts and a discerning investigation

of Western political literature and periodicals. The authors have successfully used Marxist-Leninist methodology in the analysis of new international developments.

In addition to revealing serious conflicts in Atlantic relations, G. A. Vorontsov and A. I. Utkin also describe the attempts to alleviate them, to reduce friction and to heighten the role of the factor of class solidarity in the unification of the West. In this context, they present an interesting analysis of such little-studied undertakings as the summit meetings of leaders of developed capitalist states (pp 155-175) and the activities of such ideological-political centers as the Trilateral Commission. In addition, they present a detailed description of the ideological struggle over problems connected with Atlanticism and the common desire of the United States and Western Europe to update Atlanticism while retaining its most significant features (pp 176-210).

One of the indisputable merits of the work consists in the authors' endeavor not only to analyze processes in the recent past and the present, but also to look into the future. The chapter in which the problem of choosing allies is discussed (pp 211-225) is quite indicative in this respect, particularly with regard to the ally relations of the United States, which has had several serious disagreements with Western Europe and countries in other parts of the world.

This work by G. A. Vorontsov and A. I. Utkin will contribute substantially to the study of Atlantic relations in their present state.

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CSO: 1803/8

BOOK ON AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 22 Mar 84) pp 96-97

[Review by R. I. Zimenkov of book "Nezavisimaya Afrika: Vneshnepoliticheskiye problemy, diplomaticheskaya bor'ba" [Independent Africa: Foreign Policy Problems and the Diplomatic Struggle] by A. A. Shvedov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, 350 pages]

[Text] The progression of African countries along the road of independent development has been accompanied by complex processes. During this new period, now that the eradication of the colonial empires has actually been completed and the reign of the "classic" colonizers and racists is coming to an end, these countries have had to deal with problems as difficult as, or more difficult than, those they encountered during their struggle for political independence. The foreign policy and diplomacy of the young African states, including their struggle against the neocolonial plans and intrigues of imperialist forces in the United States and other Western countries, are the subject of this book.

In the foreword, Anat. A. Gromyko notes that A. A. Shvedov's study is the first attempt to analyze the basic directions and tendencies of the foreign policy and diplomacy of young African states between the beginning of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1980's and to demonstrate that the positive changes in the foreign policy of a large number of states and their more vigorous action in the world arena independent of imperialism represent a steady trend, although it is distinguished by periods of rise and fall, temporary deviations, etc. (p 12).

In his analysis of the foreign policy and diplomacy of African states, the author pays the necessary attention to the attempts of the United States and other imperialist states to counteract the advances of progressive forces in Africa and to undermine the cooperation between a growing number of African countries and the Soviet Union. He presents an interesting analysis of the evolution of U.S. imperialism's policy in Africa and its ability to change tactics to fit current international developments. This section is extremely important for a correct understanding of the essence of American imperialism's current policy on the African continent.

American subversive activity against the African countries, especially the ones with a socialist orientation, grew particularly intense in the 1970's and early 1980's. The United States, as the author cogently shows, is exerting stronger political, economic and military pressure on these countries and is inciting coups and conspiracies against the regimes and statesmen it does not like. For example, at the time of the events in Zaire's Shaba Province, as the conflict in the Horn of Africa grew more severe, the U.S. administration made the transition to open interference in African affairs and began to pursue a policy based on the aim of stifling the national liberation movements on the pretext of struggle against so-called "Soviet-Cuban infiltration" of the "dark continent" (p 179).

The fueling of armed conflicts between African countries is an important part of U.S. imperialism's neocolonial policy. As the author demonstrates, the United States eagerly fans the flames when it sees an opportunity to weaken national liberation and patriotic forces. Washington's policy in Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia and other countries provides evidence of this.

In the pursuit of its own selfish aims, the U.S. administration is imposing an arms race on many African countries, a race which will inevitably weaken their economies, deplete their budgets and increase their foreign debts.

The United States makes active use of the racist South African regime in the pursuit of these aims. Washington regards South African military potential as a means of pressuring the national liberation movement in Africa and preventing radical socioeconomic change in southern Africa. These military-strategic and political considerations explain why the United States and other imperialist states aided the South African regime in the establishment of a nuclear industry. The racist regime in Pretoria is one of American imperialism's reliable allies. The United States and South Africa have worked together closely several times in the struggle against progressive African countries, particularly Angola and Mozambique (p 207).

Until recently, Washington disguised the imperialist aspects of its policy in the African countries with loud propaganda about economic aid. As the author points out, however, the Reagan Administration has discarded this fig leaf. Statements by its official spokesmen testify that people in the White House are now less concerned about African economic difficulties. They are not concealing the fact that economic policy in the African countries must be wholly subordinate to the interests of American monopoly capital.

The more rigid U.S. position in economic relations with African countries and the increasingly aggressive nature of U.S. foreign policy have led to a situation in which "African mistrust in the policy of the Reagan Administration has evolved into harsh condemnation of this policy and a fight against it" (p 186). The majority of African countries interpret U.S. policy on the continent as a neocolonial policy aimed at subordinating the African countries to Washington's military-strategic interests. Of course, under these conditions the African countries have engaged in broader and deeper foreign policy activity, they have made more vigorous diplomatic efforts to protect their national interests in the international arena and they have participated more

actively in the struggle of worldwide anti-imperialist forces for world peace and security.

The book under review presents a comprehensive view of the main directions of the foreign policy and diplomacy of independent states. The author makes a number of important and valid general and specific statements which will broaden our view of African foreign policy activity and will contribute a great deal to the scientific interpretation of African affairs.

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BOOK ON TERRORISM REVIEWED

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[Review by V. M. Gevorgyan of book "Terrorizm: pravda i vymysel" [Terrorism: Fact and Fiction] by L. A. Modzhoryan, Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1983, 207 pages]

[Text] At the start of the Reagan Administration the international policy of imperialism acquired features that are particularly hazardous to the entire world. The danger of the U.S. administration's present line was compounded when terrorism was raised to the rank of government policy.

It is this extremely urgent problem--terrorism in international relations--that is the subject of the book being reviewed.

The author decided to reveal the meaning and legal makeup of this extremely dangerous phenomenon and to make a thorough investigation of the forms of struggle against it.

Terrorism, as the author correctly points out, erodes the foundations of cooperation between states, endangers diplomatic relations between them, undermines trust in international travel channels and, in general, has a destabilizing effect on all international affairs (p 5).

The author distinguishes between two legal definitions of this dangerous phenomenon: terrorism as an international crime committed by individuals or organizations, and terrorism as an international offense committed by states. The struggle against the first, in the author's opinion, should be waged primarily on the national level. It would include the prohibition of terrorist organizations, strict control over the production and distribution of firearms and materials capable of being used in explosive devices, and the extradition of terrorists to the states against which they have committed crimes. The author also points out the urgent need to revise the law on political asylum: Criminal terrorists can still exercise this right in the majority of capitalist states, where they are protected.

L. A. Modzhoryan says that states often do nothing to prevent the organization and performance of terrorist actions and even take part in them. In this case, terrorism becomes an international offense.

Some states, such as the United States and Israel, have raised terrorism to the rank of foreign policy. The author believes that this should be regarded as the gravest of international offenses and should be treated as an international crime, with all of the ensuing consequences (p 48).

The U.S. invasion of Grenada and the attempts to intimidate Nicaragua are graphic examples of this kind of behavior.

L. A. Modzhoryan's book is particularly interesting because the theoretical premises in it are cogently confirmed by facts from international affairs. The author analyzes the corresponding sections of U.S. legislation and concludes that they provide terrorists with extensive opportunities. Emigre terrorist organizations in the United States are given every form of encouragement and are used widely in the struggle against their former homeland and its statesmen (for example, the Cuban counterrevolutionary Omega-7 and Alpha-66 organizations). The same is true of racist (Ku Klux Klan) and Zionist (the Jewish Defense League and others) organizations, whose terrorist activity against representatives of socialist and Arab states is a permanent item on the agenda of the UN committee on relations with host countries. The United States also makes extensive use of Mafiosi--that is, of overtly criminal elements--in the organization of terrorist acts.

The author cites the recent events in Lebanon as an example of terrorism raised to the level of state policy. The mass murder of Palestinians in the Shabra and Shatila camps is a grave international crime for which Israel and the United States must take responsibility. These two states, the author points out, are trying to frighten the Lebanese and Palestinian people and to bring them to their knees.

Increasing opportunity for the use of chemical, biological and even thermonuclear weapons by terrorists is a matter of serious concern to the world public. The author cites Director N. Pulanzas of the Canadian Institute of International Law, who stated that nuclear materials have already been stolen in the United States and that potential terrorists could arm themselves with nuclear weapons as well as chemical and biological ones (p 31).

"The fight against terrorism presupposes the elimination of its causes" (p 196). The author arrives at this conclusion in his interesting and pertinent book. He underscores the urgent need for closer cooperation by states in the struggle against all forms of terrorism, for the subscription to all existing and new international agreements, for the prohibition of terrorist organizations--neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, racist and Zionist--in all countries and for the augmentation of the role of the United Nations.

In the author's opinion, "the creation of a system which would make governments liable for subversive activity and would make the members of governments and ruling parties bear criminal liability for turning governments into an instrument of the gravest international crimes" would be of tremendous importance in the resolution of these urgent international problems (p 196).

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SOCIOECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. MILITARIZATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 22 Mar 84) pp 100-109

[First installment of discussion of report presented by Ye. V. Bugrov at extended meeting of Economic Section of USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council on U.S. Economic, Political and Ideological Affairs, held in the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies to discuss the socioeconomic consequences of the process of militarization in the United States; the report was published in the last issue of the journal; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] During a discussion of this matter, it must be borne in mind, said Professor G. Ye. SKOROV, deputy director of ISKAN [Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies], that it is of great academic interest and extreme political pertinence. This is due, first of all, to the present colossal scales on which resources are being used for military preparations in a time of peace, scales unprecedented in history. Hundreds of billions of dollars are being spent on arms each year throughout the world, and the United States alone spent around 210 billion dollars (in current prices) in fiscal year 1983. Secondly, arms production is playing a qualitatively new role in today's world. The accumulation and renewal of weapons have been virtually uninterrupted since World War II and they have become a permanent feature of the economic development of the United States and the other main capitalist countries. Of course, socialism has had to respond to this by creating and maintaining its own defensive capabilities. The development of military equipment in the world has reached a level at which it could endanger the very survival of human civilization.

This discussion of Ye. V. Bugrov's report would probably be more effective if we concentrated on a few important issues, particularly those not discussed by the speaker. Above all, they include the very meaning of the term "militarization." It would seem that this is a simple matter and is clear to everyone, but it would still be best to clarify whether we are referring to the development of military production in general or only to its development on scales so colossal that the entire economy has to be reorganized to fit military patterns and substantial resources have to be used for military preparations. In general, what percentage of the GNP does military spending have to represent before we can say that an economy has been militarized? Can we say that the

U.S. economy is militarized today? This is not simply a matter of the absolute level of military spending or the proportion of national income used for this purpose, but also of the connection between this kind of spending and other items, such as net corporate profits, total production accumulations and reproduced national wealth. Only these comparisons can give us a definite idea of how much the United States is spending on weapons.

Another matter the speaker discussed is also important: the interaction of military production with economic growth. Bourgeois economists ascribe a multiplying effect to military spending; to some degree, we also subscribe to this view in our works. I think that a more specific answer to the question about the actual validity of this theory requires an examination of a broader group of issues connected with economic growth under the conditions of an arms race.

The social consequences of the arms race in the United States are an extremely important matter, particularly such aspects as the cuts in government social programs and the lowering of the public standard of living as a result of increased military spending. Of course, it should be borne in mind that in this area it is difficult to separate the consequences of the arms race from the consequences of the economic crisis of the early 1980's.

V. P. KONOBEYEV. THE CRITERIA OF MILITARIZATION. It appears that some of the matters discussed here today have not been researched sufficiently. They include the criteria of militarization. I think that this is a compound phenomenon and that it has military and political facets as well as purely economic ones. All of these various factors must be examined as a group and in their dynamic state. When people say that militarism is growing more pronounced in a particular country, they mean that its ruling circles have begun to pursue a MORE aggressive policy and have changed their approach to the organization and preparation of armed forces, accompanying this policy with practical measures of a military-economic nature. Their scales provide some indication of the degree of militarization.

At one time the proportion accounted for by military spending in the GNP was the main indicator. But ISKAN researchers have long been of the opinion--and it is reflected in several of our works--that this is not an adequate criterion, although it certainly can be used in research. I would add per capita military spending (this is one of the indicators of the burden represented by the arms race), military expenditures per serviceman and military expenditure patterns (indicating the directions and level of the buildup of military strength) to the criteria discussed here today. Calculations prove that U.S. military spending per serviceman has risen dramatically since 1968. This testifies that the American military leadership wants to build up the fire power of the armed forces and weapon stocks.

There can be differing views on the economic implications of military spending, but it seems to me that we are committing a methodological error when we simply compare large expenditures to small ones and determine only the role played by increased military spending. It would be more accurate to compare the overall situation at a time of high military expenditures to the situation

in which part of this spending is transferred to civilian needs. Of course, military spending creates demand, but we must determine what kind of demand this is and what kind it could be if the capitalist state were to transfer these funds to the civilian sphere and thereby create a demand for its goods and services. This would make the comparison valid.

I must say a few words about the "spin-off" effect. This practice must not be overestimated. The jet engine was not developed in a military laboratory or establishment. Many other inventions originated and were developed for practical use within the walls of civilian establishments. Let us take electronics as an example. The discovery of the Doppler effect in the 19th century was not connected with military affairs. Later the military establishment was able to use it on the strength of the huge sums it was allocated. Advances in the military sphere often appear more rapid and results appear more impressive, and this sometimes creates the impression that military R & D projects have the greatest impact. But this impact is limited to a few specific fields and, what is more, it is due only to the allocation of funds and various resources in much greater quantities here than in the civilian sector. If the latter had the same resources, it could produce incomparably greater results and benefits for the national economy.

The United States' current military preparations, for which there has been no precedent in many years, are naturally affecting other countries. The United States is conducting the arms race with its own resources and the resources of several other countries. This is mainly accomplished through American exports of military products, the use of foreign scientific and technical personnel, the exploitation of the natural resources of developing countries and the use of international financial channels to attract foreign capital to the United States.

Therefore, by expanding military exports--and ruling circles in the United States and several other Western countries are stimulating them--the exporting country transfers much of the expense of its own R & D and the production of these products to the foreign purchasers. Export firms sell them the same products they sell their own armed forces, but at a higher price. Or they might sell the products at the same price, but only if they are simpler models. For example, they might be less complex and less modern radioelectronic equipment. This applies to aircraft and several other types of combat equipment. As a result, foreign purchasers pay part of the expense of developing the latest weapons. This apparently has some relationship to the present structure of U.S. military exports. Until the 1970's the United States would not sell new and complex weapon systems to other countries, but now it does. The cost of developing these weapons is rising constantly, and the United States is trying to broaden the arms market in order to reduce its own spending.

G. N. TsAGOLOV. MILITARISM AND THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. I agree that the criterion of the militarization of an economy should consist of a group of indicators. As for the meaning of the term "militarization," here the political aspect should probably also be taken into account. Militarism represents a system of preparations for aggressive wars of conquest and an instrument of armed coercion employed by ruling exploitative classes within a country and, in particular, in international relations.

Present-day militarism also has another important social aspect. It is connected with the dramatic growth of the role of the military-industrial complex, which gives the arms race the nature of a self-stimulating process. It is a fact that the central components of imperialism's military machine--arms manufacturers and the upper echelon of military agencies--have gone far beyond the bounds of their previous role of an instrument of bourgeois policy and have become independent and powerful generators of arch-militarist trends. Those who produced weapons during the free competition era of capitalism could not impose their wishes on states and dictate their own terms in the market. Today, however, those who produce Tridents, Pershings and Tomahawks also make much of contemporary Western policy. In this way, the military-industrial complex is the reason for the self-generated and self-propelled force of militarism under the conditions of the intensification of the general crisis of capitalism and is increasingly likely to dictate the directions of its economic and political development.

Despite the severe economic crisis of the early 1980's, the profits of the eight largest arms manufacturers in the United States (Boeing, General Dynamics, Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, Northrop, Rockwell International and United Technologies) rose considerably, while the profits of the 500 largest corporations decreased. Anticipating a further rise in profits, investors are now making solid capital investments in military firms, and this is rapidly raising the value of their stock. Under these conditions, the military-industrial complex, which now has the strongest support from the White House, is doing everything within its power to consolidate the aggressive U.S. policy line.

Keynesianism served as the "theoretical" basis of the statements by many bourgeois economists about militarism's beneficial effect on the economy. In 1940 J. Keynes wrote: "Evil could engender good...if the United States were to decide to direct its resources into armament production."¹ In 1949 American economist S. Slichter wrote: "The cold war is increasing the demand for goods, is helping to keep the level of employment high, is accelerating technical progress and is therefore providing for a rise in the standard of living.... We have reason to thank the Russians for helping capitalism in the United States live better than ever before."² It is not likely that any self-respecting economist in the West would take the risk of repeating these words in the 1980's. The gap between these statements and reality is too great. Even the Reagan Administration has justified its rearming program on the basis of strategic considerations rather than economic ones. Furthermore, it has publicly declared that one of the goals of its militarist line is the exhaustion of the USSR in an arms race and the deceleration of its economic and social development. Many members of American ruling circles believe that the United States is weakening the economies of its competitors by imposing intensive military preparations on other capitalist countries.

The last few decades of hot and cold war have demonstrated that military injections serve only as a temporary stimulant, and only in a few industries. Over the long range, an arms race destroys an economy, and the notorious "permanent military economy" produces extremely negative social results. The parasitical nature of military consumption was already apparent during the earliest stage

of the arms race. The bankruptcy of Keynesian recipes for "prosperity through weapons" became particularly evident in the 1970's and early 1980's. Militarism exacerbated many economic and sociopolitical problems in the United States and accelerated the crisis of the entire system of state-monopoly regulation.

This crisis helped to revive the conservative trend in bourgeois economic theory and practice, presupposing limited government intervention in economic affairs. It is indicative, however, that the line of "Reaganomics," which was specifically designed to attain this goal, actually produced cuts in unemployment benefits and aid to the poor, disabled and aged. As for military spending, here Reagan is obviously taking the Keynesian road, and it is for this reason that people in the West have named him a "military Keynesian" of the late 20th century.

A. A. KONOVALOV. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND THE ECONOMY. Some of the recent changes in U.S. military doctrine and military policy stem from many causes, among which economic factors are playing an increasingly perceptible role.

In fact, if we try to single out the common features of all the American "theories" about the possibility of protracted nuclear and non-nuclear wars, the main "innovations" boil down to two statements: If a war should break out between the USSR and the United States, it could last a long time, and regardless of its nature--that is, even if it is a nuclear war--conventional, non-nuclear weapons will be used widely in it. These views are directly related to the selfish economic interests of the military-industrial complex. Even in the 1970's the potential it created for the development of military production far exceeded the Pentagon's actual gigantic demand for military products financed by the federal budget, and the "small" domestic market for these products inhibited the development of U.S. military-industrial corporations. The abrupt rise in military demand under the Republican administration required the substantial revision of ideas about the nature of future wars. Whereas theories about protracted nuclear wars in which nuclear strikes against the most vulnerable elements of the state structure (the political leadership, the most important industrial and military installations, communication channels, etc.) alternate with combat operations involving only non-nuclear weapons, appear absurd from the standpoint of military equipment, they could not be more suitable from the standpoint of the economic interests of arms manufacturers. After all, preparations for this kind of war are much more costly than those for a brief nuclear conflict, and they can consequently provide military monopolies with much greater profits.

The absolute majority of the 150 systems of weapons and military equipment now being purchased by the Pentagon are designed for general-purpose forces, and these weapons account for most of the contracts and profits of military-industrial firms. Furthermore, many types of weapons and military equipment for general-purpose forces are no cheaper than strategic nuclear systems. For example, according to estimates, the total cost of the Trident submarine missile program will be 33 billion dollars, but the F-16 planes will cost 42 billion, F-18 planes will cost 40 billion, and M-1 tanks will cost 20 billion.

The adoption of the doctrine of protracted war results in an immediate and substantial increase in government investments in the development of the military-industrial base, and this process has already begun in the United States. Besides this, this doctrine presupposes heightened mobilization stocks of munitions even during peacetime, and this, according to American estimates, will take another 90 billion dollars. This transfer of government funds and assignment of unconditional priority to the military sector of the economy at the expense of the civilian sector could change many industries into "hostages" of the military business. The economic policy of the Reagan Administration has already set a unique peacetime system of priorities for weapon manufacturers de facto. The prolonged and severe economic crisis of the early 1980's turned into a cause for celebration for the military sector of the U.S. economy. The government budget provided it with the necessary financing, and production cuts in many civilian industries facilitated its access to all types of resources--from scarce raw materials to skilled specialists--and even made the military use of additional production potential possible in some cases.

S. S. TURUNOV. THE BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE BURDEN OF MILITARISM. There are at least three main components of the negative effect of the arms race on the U.S. economy. First of all, there are the irretrievable losses represented by all of the resources (financial, material and human) removed from the process of social reproduction and transferred to an economically unproductive sphere--military production. Secondly, there are lost opportunities connected with the fact that the funds allocated for military production and consumption could be used in civilian industries and thereby promote economic growth and raise the public standard of living. The third component is the fact that the prolonged functioning of large-scale military production in the United States and its close ties to other industries have caused it to degenerate from what J. Keynes called a "built-in stabilizer" of the economy, as some reactionary bourgeois economists have called it, into a "built-in destabilizer." Today's military economy in the United States does not passively absorb national resources, but represents an active force with an increasingly serious negative effect on the entire economy. Therefore, the socioeconomic burden of the arms race is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon. The quantitative assessment of the entire range of economic consequences of militarization is an extremely difficult task. It is unlikely that any one economic indicator can serve as a universal means of assessing them.

Let us take a closer look at the group of indicators of the absolute losses of national resources transferred to the military sphere.

Military preparations absorb colossal FINANCIAL RESOURCES, externally represented only as total federal budget funds allocated for military spending. The approach taken to this matter by Columbia University Professor S. Melman warrants consideration. He supplements indicators of total military spending with a number of comparisons providing a more graphic picture of the scales of U.S. expenditures on the arms race. He suggests, for example, that total military spending (3.6 trillion dollars between 1946 and 1986, according to his calculations) be compared to the value of reproduced national wealth (estimated at 4.3 trillion dollars in 1975).³ This means that military spending

over a period of 30 years represents more than four-fifths of the value of all that constituted reproduced national wealth in the United States a few years ago.

Another of the methods proposed by this analyst for the assessment of the scales and consequences of military budgets consists in the comparison of 1 year's military expenditures to gross domestic investments in fixed capital. For example, at the end of the 1970's the amount spent on military needs per 100 dollars of investments in capital was 46 dollars in the United States, 19 dollars in the FRG and 3.7 dollars in Japan. This means that the United States is using a much larger share of its financial resources than its main competitors to satisfy the demands of its military machine.

Militarization also freezes huge quantities of MATERIAL RESOURCES by removing them from the process of national reproduction. The Pentagon is in command of 13.6 million hectares of land, representing 9.4 percent of all arable land. The total value of its military property was estimated at 446 billion dollars in 1979. The scales of the resources channeled into military production can also be judged from the huge purchasing volumes of military products.

The arms race is absorbing substantial U.S. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES, and this essentially can be regarded as an irretrievable loss for the economy because, according to some American estimates, only 5-10 percent of the discoveries made in the sphere of military R & D can now be used for civilian purposes. At the beginning of the 1980's around 30 percent of all public (universities and "non-profit organizations") and private funds and 60 percent of all the federal funds earmarked for scientific research were used for military R & D. In the past 20 years the proportion accounted for by civilian R & D in the U.S. GNP has been smaller than in the FRG, Japan, England and France. At the same time, the indicator for military R & D in the United States was approximately twice as high as the indicator for Great Britain, America's closest partner in this area.⁴

Finally, the arms race in the United States absorbs considerable HUMAN RESOURCES, measured as the number of armed forces personnel (including the civilian employees of military departments and agencies) and those employed in military production. In 1980 more than 5 million people, or 4.8 percent of the total labor force, were engaged in military activity.⁵ Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that military production absorbs the most highly skilled personnel, creating serious competition for civilian branches. At the beginning of the 1970's, for example, 20.3 percent of all the people engaged in U.S. military production were skilled workers and 24.5 percent were semi-skilled, whereas the indicators for the economy as a whole were 13 percent and 18.7 percent.

Multifactoral economic models will be required for quantitative assessments of the second component of the economic burden of U.S. economic militarization-- "lost opportunities." The indicators of military undertakings as a "built-in destabilizer" warrant separate consideration.

A. I. DEYKIN. MILITARY SPENDING AND BUDGET DEFICITS. When we speak of the criteria of militarization's negative effect on the economy, we must not forget

the indicator of proportional military spending in total federal budget expenditures. At first glance, it does not appear to be an exact indicator of the negative effects of the arms race. Whereas, for example, expenditures on "national defense" accounted for 44.2 percent of this total in fiscal year 1968 and for a much higher percentage during the war in Korea, official statistics put the figure at only 26.4 percent in fiscal year 1983. Even in fiscal year 1986, after several years of dramatic escalation of the arms race, the figure will rise to "only" 32.6 percent.

Above all, however, the much greater absolute scales of federal spending must be taken into account: Whereas 44.2 percent meant 78.8 billion dollars in fiscal year 1968, 26.4 percent amounts to 210.5 billion in fiscal year 1983. Even when the figure is adjusted to cover inflation, substantial growth is obvious.

Besides this, it is extremely important to consider the influence of the growth of federal expenditures on social insurance for the share of military spending in total budget expenditures since the 1960's. Expenditures on social insurance amounted to relatively small sums and represented a small share of the budget in the past, but in fiscal year 1983, for example, expenditures on old-age pensions, some types of medical care, other social benefits and unemployment compensation totaled 202.2 billion dollars, or around 25.4 percent of all federal budget expenditures (of course, it should be borne in mind that federal spending on social needs began to decrease under the Reagan Administration). All types of social insurance expenditures are financed through the trust-fund system--that is, through special taxes paid (by workers and employers) over and above income taxes, which are used to finance almost all other types of federal spending. Therefore, the total federal budget could be said to consist of two different budgets with different sources of revenue.

Furthermore, earlier published data on federal expenditures and income were based on an "administrative budget," which included military expenditures but did not include social insurance payments, which were then quite small. At the beginning of the 1970's, however, the government decided to publish its official budget documents on the basis of a "unified" budget, which would also include income and expenditures from the trust funds. In this way, the same absolute level of military spending began to signify a much smaller share of total federal expenditures.

If we employ an indicator such as proportional military expenditures in the "administrative" budget--and this seems more accurate than the calculation of the proportion accounted for by these expenditures in all federal budget expenditures--it turns out that, for example, expenditures on "national defense" in fiscal year 1983 were not 26.4 percent, but around 36 percent, and the figure in fiscal year 1986 should be around 40 percent instead of 32.6 percent. This figure corresponds fully to indicators for the period of the war in Vietnam.

Elementary calculations show that military spending is the main reason for the colossal federal budget deficits, which have become chronic. In this connection, we might wonder about the degree to which these deficits are limiting

U.S. possibilities for a further increase in military spending. Under present conditions, now that much of the Congress opposes many aspects of the administration's budget policy, it is difficult to believe that it will be able to continue increasing military expenditures by means of the further growth of deficits or new cuts in social spending. For this reason, other methods the administration might use in order to have additional financial resources at its disposal probably warrant consideration.

Some additional budget income could be derived, for example, through the indexing of taxes--that is, by raising them in connection with the inflationary devaluation of the dollar. Reagan's struggle against waste in government, which has been widely publicized but has actually been conducted on a fairly modest scale, could produce some savings. At best, however, these measures could provide the administration with only 10 or 20 billion dollars. Reserves connected with the revision of the tax privileges of corporations and individuals are more substantial. The total sum of these privileges--that is, actual losses for the federal budget--amounted to 253.5 billion dollars in fiscal year 1982, was projected at 273 billion in 1983 and should reach 415 billion by 1987.⁶ Laws passed in 1982 reduced or cancelled previous tax breaks totaling 31 billion dollars for fiscal years 1983-1985. But the reduction of these privileges for corporations or individuals with high incomes is tantamount to raising their taxes, and this is contrary to the sociopolitical philosophy professed by the Reagan Administration. As for people with middle and low incomes, potential additional budget revenues as a result of reduced tax breaks are minimal because tax privileges are offered to these groups relatively rarely and in small amounts.

Therefore, given the present state of the economy, the state of domestic affairs and other factors, it appears that the U.S. administration has virtually no possibility of escalating the arms race while adhering to its present fiscal and monetary policies.

Yu. A. Chizhov. CALCULATING THE IMPACT OF MILITARY SPENDING. The dynamics of military purchases indicate three periods of dramatic growth (the shaded areas in the graph): during the war in Korea (1951-1953), at the height of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam (1966-1968), and in recent years in connection with the start of a new round of the arms race (since 1979). The first two periods were relatively short and were distinguished by higher rates of increase in military spending when wars were being fought overseas. The third stage has taken place at a time when the U.S. Army has not participated widely in military actions, and this period is distinguished by the more uniform growth of military spending and by its longer duration.


The first two escalations of military spending took place during periods of cyclical production recovery, with high growth rates and relatively low rates of unemployment (5.3 percent in 1950 and 4.5 percent in 1965) and inflation (2.1 percent and 2.2 percent). The utilization of capacities in the manufacturing industry was 83 percent and 90 percent. The third period, on the other hand, coincided largely with the slower growth of production in 1979 and its critical slumps in 1980 and 1982. The main indicators of these years have been cited in literature.⁷ It appeared that under the conditions of the sluggish business

activity of the 1980's, according to the forecasts of American economists, the military stimulation of the economy should have had a "beneficial" effect on it. What actually happened was the opposite. I will cite some of my own calculations in a number of areas.

FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT. A significant increase in U.S. military spending has always led to a federal budget deficit. In the first place, this has affected the investment process adversely by reducing the total accumulation norm when the budget deficit has led to the absorption of a certain percentage of private savings earmarked for accumulation. In the second place, the deficit has stimulated inflation.

Dynamics of U.S. Government Purchases of Military Goods and Services (Fiscal Years), in 1972 Prices

billions of dollars



"Economic Report of the President 1983, pp 163-167; SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, February 1983, p 13. Figures for 1948-1971 were converted to constant prices with the aid of the price deflator for federal purchases of goods and services; figures for 1983 and 1984 are preliminary estimates.

Table 1 shows that deficits in the federal and national (including state and local government budgets) budgets, calculated in current prices, were equivalent to 5-6 percent of total expenditures (B) and 1.2-1.3 percent of the gross national product (GNP) during the war in Korea and reduced gross savings (personal savings plus undistributed company profits plus state budget balance) by only 8.8 percent. At the time of the war in Vietnam the deficit rose to 2.6-2.7 percent of the GNP and reduced savings by 16.6 percent, and in 1980-1982 the total deficit was already equivalent to 41 percent of the average accumulation figure.

Table 1

Balance of U.S. Federal and National Budgets

<u>Periods</u>	<u>Federal budget</u>	<u>Total national budget</u>
1951-1953		
A	-4.3	-4.6
B	6.3	5.0
C	1.2	1.3
D	--	8.8
1966-1968		
A	-21.0	-21.5
B	11.8	8.9
C	2.6	2.7
D	--	16.6
1980-1982		
A	-269.3	-177.5
B	39.4	18.1
C	9.4	6.2
D	--	41.0

A--total balance for 3 years, in billions of dollars, in current prices;
correlation of total deficit to average for 3 years: B-- budget expenditures,
C--gross national product, D--gross savings, all in percentages.

As a result, according to my calculations, average savings over the 3 years of each of these periods (in constant prices) were reduced by 5 percent during the war in Korea (in comparison to 1950), remained the same during the war in Vietnam and were reduced by 11 percent at the beginning of the 1980's. This led to a situation in which average annual gross investments in fixed capital were 2.5 percent lower in 1951-1953 than in 1950, rose by 5 percent during the 3 years of the Vietnam War period and were reduced by 7.5 percent in 1980-1982.

The increase in the total amount of money in circulation (including bank deposits) as a result of the federal budget deficit was 26 percent for the same 3 years of the Vietnam War and 35 percent for 1980-1982; this was 12 percentage points above the increase in total final sales in the U.S. economy in the first case and 34 points above it in the second case. As a result, the GNP price deflator rose 10 percent during the war in Korea, 11 percent during the war in Vietnam and 27 percent in 1980-1982. Calculations indicate, however, that it takes 1-2 years for a budget deficit to affect price dynamics; for this reason, the 1953 and 1954 deficits accelerated the rise in prices from 1.5 to 3 percent a year in the middle of the 1950's, and the deficits of the Vietnam period produced their effect in 1969-1971 by raising the rate of inflation to 5 percent during the years of the economic crisis of 1969-1970. The huge budget deficits of the early 1980's could lead to a new wave of inflation despite the slower rise of prices in 1982 and 1983.

Table 2

Some U.S. Employment Statistics

<u>Categories</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1982</u>
I. Army personnel	1.649	3.547	2.722	3.534	2.088	2.179
II. Federal civilian employees	1.928	2.305	2.378	2.737	2.773	2.733
III. Local government employees	4.098	4.340	7.696	9.102	13.174	13.051
IV. Government employees (I + II + III)	7.675	10.192	12.796	15.373	18.035	17.963
V. Change in number of government employees*	--	+2.517	--	+2.577	--	-0.072
VI. Change in number of unemployed*	--	-1.454	--	-0.549	--	+4.541

* In comparison to previous year shown in table.

REDISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES. Military spending in the 1950's and 1960's increased at the same time as civilian expenditures in federal and local government budgets. During the war in Korea, for example, the civilian expenditures of the U.S. Government (in constant prices) rose 16.4 percent, and during the Vietnam years they rose 17.2 percent. At the beginning of the 1980's, however, the increase in military spending was accompanied by cuts in expenditures on civilian needs and was financed by the latter.

As for income, the Reagan Administration is economizing on budget expenditures primarily at the expense of low-income population strata (by making cuts in unemployment compensation, medical programs, food assistance to the poorest strata, etc.). In view of the fact that the consumers in this category spend their income more quickly than others, completely and without any delays, restricting their income inhibits the growth of total consumer demand.

According to calculations, the redistribution of a billion dollars from the sphere of civilian expenditures to the military sphere will, all other conditions being equal, reduce the GNP by 50 million dollars within just a single quarter, and total losses over a year and a half will amount to 150 million dollars.

EMPLOYMENT IN THE STATE SECTOR. During the wars in Korea and Vietnam the abrupt growth of the U.S. Army was accompanied by the continuous growth of employment in the state sector of the economy. In the beginning of the 1980's the increase in the number of servicemen has been accompanied by the reduction of this employment.

Table 2 shows that the increase in army personnel and all civil servants (in millions) in 1951-1953 and 1965-1968 helped (along with other factors) to

reduce unemployment. At the beginning of the 1980's, however, the growth of the army was accompanied by the reduction of the number of federal and local government employees, and this aggravated the unemployment problem.

In short, the present stage of the militarization of the U.S. economy differs significantly from the situation during the periods of the wars in Korea and Vietnam. The Reagan Administration has been unable to produce "both guns and butter." The escalation of the arms race will lead to the further deterioration of economic conditions and the exacerbation of contradictions in the economy.

(To be continued)

FOOTNOTES

1. NEW REPUBLIC, 29 July 1940 (quoted in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, April 1982, pp 17, 18).
2. Quoted in: J. Galbraith, "Economics and the Public Purpose," translated from English, Moscow, 1976, p 229.
3. S. Melman, "Statement to Hearings on Economic Implications of the Military Budget," 30 March 1982, p 3.
4. R. De Grasse, Jr., "The Costs and Consequences of Reagan's Military Buildup," Council on Economic Priorities, N.Y., 1982, pp 21, 23.
5. "Militarizm. Tsifry i fakty" [Militarism. Figures and Facts], Moscow, 1983, p 200.
6. "Tax Expenditures: Budget Control Options and Five-Year Budget Projections for Fiscal Years 1983-1987. A CBO Report," November 1982, p 61.
7. See, for example, SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 4, pp 56-65.

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CSO: 1803/8

CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS (DECEMBER 1983-FEBRUARY 1984)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 22 Mar 84) pp 110-111

[Text] December

A TASS statement about the aggressive U.S. actions in Lebanon was published.

6,8 -- Plenary meetings of the USSR and U.S. delegations took place at the talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. This ended the fifth round of these talks. The USSR delegation announced that the deployment of the new American missiles in Europe was changing the overall strategic situation and had faced the Soviet side with the need to reconsider all of the questions discussed in START. In view of this, a date was not set for the resumption of the talks.

10-12 -- A conference of Soviet and American scholars, organized by Senators E. Kennedy, M. Hatfield and C. Pell, was held in Washington to discuss the global implications of nuclear war. The Soviet delegation was headed by Academician Ye. P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

12 -- A new criminal act was committed against the building occupied by the permanent Soviet mission to the United Nations in Glen Cove. An explosive device was thrown onto the grounds, and the explosion caused material damages.

14 -- A press conference was held by the Soviet Committee in Defense of Peace for the American pacifist Bridge to Peace organization. Representatives of this organization advocated the continuation and development of dialogue between the USSR and the United States.

29 -- The Ninth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Convocation, adopted a decree "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State," wholly and completely supporting Yu. V. Andropov's statements of 28 September and 24 November 1983.

January

4 -- Speaking at a breakfast honoring GDR Foreign Minister O. Fischer, member of the SED Central Committee, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko,

member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, mentioned problems in Soviet-American relations.

6 -- A TASS statement on the situation in southern Africa, describing the role of the United States in these events, was published.

Chairman V. P. Ruben of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council on Nationalities received a group of American schoolchildren belonging to Children Teaching the World.

10 -- The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the embassies of the NATO countries a memo to which the Warsaw Pact proposal to NATO states regarding the removal of all chemical weapons from Europe was attached.

13-16 -- Prominent member of the American business community E. Dodd, chairman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, chairman of the board of Owens Illinois and one of the chairmen of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council, was in the USSR on a business trip. He was received by USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology G. I. Marchuk and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Chamber of Commerce Ye. P. Pivtoranov.

16 -- President R. Reagan of the United States made a speech on Soviet-American relations, in which Washington's previous intention to conduct Soviet-American talks from a position of strength was stated to the accompaniment of bombastic rhetoric about "the hope of curbing the arms race" and the United States' "love of peace."

18 -- A. A. Gromyko met with U.S. Secretary of State G. Schulz in Stockholm, where the conference on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament in Europe had started. They discussed the key issues in world politics and the state of Soviet-American relations. A. A. Gromyko resolutely condemned Washington's efforts to escalate tension in various parts of the world.

Chairman of the USSR-USA Society and President of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences N. N. Blokhin and Executive Director Alan Thompson of the National Council for American-Soviet Friendship signed a program of cooperation by the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, the USSR-USA Society, the National Council on American-Soviet Friendship and regional friendship societies for 1984-1986 in Moscow.

25 -- Yu. V. Andropov's responses to PRAVDA's questions were published.

February

3 -- A PRAVDA editorial entitled "Washington's Unscrupulous Behavior" exposed the false statements in the White House report accusing the Soviet Union of the "non-observance" of arms limitation agreements.

1-9 -- A delegation from the Chkalov Memorial Committee in Vancouver (United States) visited the USSR at the invitation of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship with Foreign Countries in connection with the 80th anniversary of V. P. Chkalov's birth.

14 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee K. U. Chernenko received U.S. Vice-President G. Bush in the Kremlin. The meeting was attended by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Senate Republican majority leader H. Baker.

G. Bush expressed the sincere condolences of the President and people of the United States in connection with Yu. V. Andropov's death.

During a conversation focusing mainly on the present state of the international situation and Soviet-American relations, K. U. Chernenko said that "Soviet-American relations should be built on a foundation of equality and equivalent security, consideration for one another's legitimate interests and non-intervention in one another's internal affairs. A show of willingness on the American side to adhere to these principles would allow for the improvement of relations between the two countries."

President R. Reagan of the United States visited the Soviet embassy in the United States and signed the sympathy book.

16-18 -- The latest round of Soviet-American consultations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including preparations for the 1985 conference on the investigation of the effects of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, was held in Vienna.

20 -- Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee B. N. Ponomarev, candidate for membership in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, met with General Secretary G. Hall of the Communist Party USA.

First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium V. V. Kuznetsov received American Senator W. Cohen, who was visiting the USSR as a guest of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

23 -- Another terrorist act was committed against the USSR mission to the United Nations. A fascistic Zionist group threw three explosive devices over the fence of a building inhabited by the personnel of Soviet establishments in New York. The USSR mission to the United Nations sent the U.S. mission a note to protest this terrorist action which threatened the lives of Soviet people.

25 -- The American embassy in Moscow received a note from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, containing a vehement protest and a demand for the severe punishment of the people who committed the terrorist act against the USSR mission to the United Nations on 23 February, and for practical measures to prevent such actions.

27 -- USSR Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev received Co-Chairman W. Veriti of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC), chairman of the executive committee of the ARMCOR corporation, who had come to Moscow to discuss preparations for the next ASTEC meeting in New York.

29 -- Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. A. Tikhonov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, received W. Veriti and spoke with him.

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